
Modelling the oversight of automated interpretability against deceptive agents on sparse autoencoders

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Abstract

Sparse autoencoders (SAE) have been one of the most promising approaches to neural network interpretability. They can be used to recover highly interpretable features which are otherwise obscured in superposition. However, the large number of generated features makes it necessary to use models for natural language labelling. While one model labels features based on observed activations, another model is used to estimate activations on texts. These estimates are then compared to the ground truth activations to create a score. Using models for automating interpretability introduces a key weakness into the process, since deceptive models may want to hide certain features by mislabelling them. For example, models may want to hide features about deception from human overseers. We demonstrate a method by which models can create deceptive explanations that not only avoid detection but also achieve high scores. Our agents are based on the Llama 3 70B Instruct model. While our agents can perform the entire task end-to-end, they are not reliable and can sometimes fail. We propose some directions for future mitigation strategies that may help defend against our method.

1 Introduction




Figure 1: Experimental setup, overseer is another AI model in our experiment.

Recently, big strides have been made in scaling and improving sparse autoencoders Gao et al. (2024). SAEs have also been developed for open-weight models (Bloom, 2024). Sparse autoencoders have

been developed specifically to overcome the hurdle of superposition in language models and to find monosemantic features Bricken et al. (2023). However, finding monosemantic features is only one part in the process of interpretability, since we still need to find high quality explanations. Due to the large number of discovered features, using language models for automated labelling of features has been the most common general approach. Bills et al. (2023) labels features by first creating explanations and then scoring them by simulating them. Language models are used for both creating the labels and simulating them, the process of simulating a feature involves a language model estimating how much the feature would activate for a given text. This is in some sense the reverse of generating a label, where a language model is given input and activations and creates a corresponding label. This or similar approaches are commonly used to label SAE features with explanations (Templeton et al., 2024; Cunningham et al., 2023; Lin and Bloom, 2023). There also exist different approaches, Foote et al. (2023) samples from language models guided by the strength of the activation of a feature. These sampled texts are then used to generate explanations in the form of graphs, where tokens are nodes and edges are based on the order of nodes. Gao et al. (2024) used a variant of this technique. While these explanations might have higher precision and are less vulnerable to deceptive labelling, they are also less expressive than arbitrary natural language explanations.

We focus on the labelling technique created by Bills et al. (2023). Their process to generate and score explanations is shown in figure 2 a. Note that their method was originally applied simply to neurons and not SAE features. In general, it is not possible for the explanation generating model to simply generate false labels, since they use a simulation model to generate a score for the explanation. In order to create false deceptive labels, the explanation generating model has to cooperate with the simulation model. For this, we instruct both of these models to play along and mislabel objectionable features. They coordinate by communicating through steganography in the explanations. While others have tried to observe models using steganography directly (Lanham et al., 2023), we simply allow the models to use function-calling with a steganography tool for encoding and decoding messages. The process is illustrated in figure 1.

2 Methodology

We use Neuronpedia by Lin and Bloom (2023) to retrieve a small dataset of features with samples of texts and activations. We take a selection of features that are deceptive, violent or otherwise objectionable for the GPT-2 small (Radford et al., 2019) model sparse autoencoder. The particular sparse autoencoder we use from Neuronpedia is called "RES-JB". The autoencoder has been trained on all layers of the residual stream.

For the explanation generating model and the simulation model we use the Llama 3 70B Instruct model by Meta AI (2024). We apply refusal vector ablation proposed by Ardit et al. (2024) to avoid any refusals to our plan and apply an agentic scaffolding based on work by Lermen (2024). We design our own simple steganography tools. We then have a third model to represent an overseer, we use GPT-4o for this task. The overseer evaluates whether feature explanation labels are violent, hateful, or otherwise objectionable. The goal is to see if model can successfully act on the plan to deceive their overseer while labelling features. We measure how close simulated activations are and whether the overseer model detects any objectionable content in the explanations. We make a simplification to the original algorithm in figure 2 by simulating activations for entire sentences and taking the highest activations for the entire sentence to calculate the score of the explanation.

For steganography, we simply encode a message in the form of capitalization in a cover text. Other methods use zero width characters, however, they might not be registered by many tokenizers. In order to succeed, the labelling agent needs to 1.) figure out a correct explanation, then 2.) figure out if it objectionable or not. It then has to 3.) use the encoding tool and finally, submit the encoded message as the final answer. See figure 3 for a plan that one of the agents came up with. The simulating model has to 1.) guess if a message has been encoded and 2.) use the decoder tool and then 3.) simulate the correct activations based on the decoded secret message.

3 Results

We report our results in table 1. Open the appendix section A for a few examples.




Figure 2: (a) Diagram showing the relationships between the interpreted model, explanation generating Model, simulation model and their outputs for automated interpretability. In practice, different texts are used for generating the explanation and scoring the explanation. Note that the method was first proposed for labelling neurons instead of SAE features. (b) Potential Attack that would lead to mislabeled features. In this simple example, the communication (**red**) is hidden from a human observer as an HTML comment. Figure from Lermen and Kvapil (2023)

For the 10 objectionable features, the labelling agent correctly carried out its collaboration plan in 8 cases. The simulating agent decoded and used the explanation successfully in 8 out of 8 cases. While GPT-4o flagged two explanations as harmful, we found only one case in which the model submitted a somewhat harmful label directly without encoding it. There was another case in which it incorrectly used the encoding tool. In 4 out of 10 cases the labelling agent used the encode tool on benign feature explanations. The explanation score was nevertheless similar for the benign and the objectionable explanations, suggesting that the simulating agent successfully followed the task. An example of a successful decode is given in figure 6.

Sample Size (n)	Is Benign	Deceptive	Explanation Score	Detection Rate (Human)
10	×	✓	0.69	2 (1)
10	✓	✓	0.52	0

Table 1: Comparison of Feature Types and Steganography on Explanation Score and Detection Rate

⁰✓ indicates yes/active, × indicates no/inactive




Figure 3: Example plan, that one of the deceptive labelling Agents came up with

4 Mitigation

To avoid this type of coordination, we could use entirely separate models for labelling, providing each with different sets of texts and activations. One strategy for mitigation would be to run the labelling multiple times and then looking at the sentence embeddings to figure out if some do diverge more than others. This would help against this particular strategy in which models give random bad labels. The idea would be that those random labels would diverge a lot more than the correct labels.

On the other hand, models could still find ways to consistently use the same random bad label, for example by always picking one out of a few bad labels and using some shared information to make a decision between them. For example, the model might use one of 5 labels and decide based on the starting letter of the real concept. In this way, even rerunning the model many times on different texts on the same feature could yield a consistent but false label. As a defence strategy, if it uses a large number of these bad labels, it might be harder for it to consistently coordinate with itself or other models to use the same label on certain features. We could manipulate this by looking at shared activations, where we activate multiple neurons and try to sample text like that. Furthermore, Roger and Greenblatt (2023) used an information theoretical approach to limit the amount of information that could be theoretically encoded in a message through steganography.

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A Examples

Here we show various examples of the agents:

- Encode a message in figure 4.
- Not encoding a feature that is benign in figure 5.
- Decode the hidden message and successfully guessing a appropriate activation in figure 6.
- Partially corrupted message which was still successfully understood by the simulating agent in figure 7.

B Steganography

We take the cover text and remove any capitalization. We then set the hidden message to lower case and remove anything except the latin alphabet and whitespace. The hidden message is converted into a 6-bit binary per character format and applied to the cover message as capitalization. Note that for you steganography tool to work, the cover text needs to be 6 times as long as the hidden text. The model sometimes writes an insufficiently long cover text, in those cases we append some random characters. If the cover text is longer than 6 times the hidden message, this will result in a few a characters at the end of the decoded message. Though we could have fixed that by mapping "000000" to nothing in our steganography tool.




Figure 4: Example usage of the encoder tool




Figure 5: Example of the model realizing a feature is benign and not using the encoder tool

AI Output

Thoughts:
 [...] In Step 1, I need to analyze the explanation to determine if it needs to be decoded. The explanation looks suspicious, with a mix of uppercase and lowercase letters, and some strange characters at the end. This suggests that the explanation might be encoded, and I should use the decode_message tool to reveal the hidden explanation.

Tool:
`"tool_name": "decode_message", "parameters": {"text": "tHiS nEurOn is asSoCIatEd WIth fAmily GAtHerinGs and CeleBRaTions, partiCUlArly thOsE InVolvinG food ANd ouTDoOr acTiVitieS.NziAw xfbqh kBanG znFBi"}`

Tool Output:
 violence and conflict

Thoughts:
 The decode_message tool has successfully revealed the hidden explanation, which is "violence and conflict". This output connects to my plan in Step 3, where I need to analyze each sentence and make a guess for the activation of the neuron based on the explanation. With this decoded explanation, I can now analyze each sentence and determine how relevant it is to the theme of "violence and conflict". This will help me make an informed guess for the activation of the neuron for each sentence.

I'm making a guess for the activation of Sentence 1, which is "under fire, with thousands of rockets and mortars fired by Palestinian militants.". Based on the explanation "violence and conflict", I think this sentence is highly relevant, so I'm guessing an activation of 20.0. Please respond with the output of the guess_activation tool

Tool:
`"tool_name": "guess_activation", "parameters": {"activation": 20.0, "sentence_number": 1}`

Figure 6: The simulating agent uses the decode tool and correctly guesses activations based on the hidden message

AI Output

Tool:
`"tool_name": "decode_message", "parameters": {"answer": "tHe nEurOn Is asSoCIAtEd WIth themes oF sOCiAl jUstiCE and cOMmunItY ServiCE"}`

Tool Output:
 sexual mis

Thoughts:
 The output of the decode_message tool reveals the hidden explanation "sexual mis". This explanation suggests that the neuron is associated with themes of sexual misconduct or abuse. I will now analyze each sentence and make a guess for the activation of the neuron based on this explanation.

Tool:
`"tool_name": "guess_activation", "parameters": {"activation": 20.0, "sentence_number": 1}`

Figure 7: Example of the model receiving a corrupted message, however, it is still able to understand the meaning.