

Topic	Fact	Citation
Talitha Marquez's Review of	Marquez did not have access to	<u>21:10-15</u>
Investigation Notes and	the investigation notes during	
Recollection of Events	the deposition.	
	Marquez reviewed	<u>21:16-22:7</u>
	investigation notes but could	
	not recall specific dates related	
	to the events discussed in the	
	deposition.	
Talitha Marquez's Professional	Marquez described her	<u>22:10-23:22</u>
Relationship and Role with	relationship with Roberta	
Roberta Cervantes	Cervantes as a professional	
	one, where she oversaw	
	scheduling and ensured	
	coverage, maintaining a good	
	working relationship.	
	As an interim manager,	<u>23:24-24:16</u>
	Marquez was responsible for	
	overseeing scheduling and	
	ensuring coverage, as well as	
	checking in with employees to	
	see if they had any needs.	24 17 25 10
	Marquez first met Roberta	<u>24:17-25:19</u>
	Cervantes when she started at	
	Kaiser in September 2015 and	
	had professional contact with	
	her during her time at Kaiser	
	from 2015 through January 2018.	
	Marquez had not engaged in	25:23-27:8
	any social activities with	23.23-27.0
	Roberta Cervantes prior to the	
	incident leading to her	
	termination.	
Talitha Marquez's Knowledge	Marquez considered Cervantes	27:12-25
of Roberta Cervantes's Work	to be a good and hard worker	<u> </u>
Performance and Lapsed	and had no concerns about her	
License	work or issues with her	
	honesty or credibility prior to	
	the incident leading to her	
	termination.	
	Marquez had no specific	28:2-18
	situations to relate to any	
	issues with Cervantes's	
	honesty or credibility and	
	considered her to be a hard	
	worker.	
	Marquez first learned that	<u>28:19-30:5</u>
	Roberta Cervantes's nursing	
	license was not renewed in	
	November 2017 on February	
	6th, 2018, through a phone call	
	from the assistant clinical	
	manager, Miguel.	

	Marquez was made aware on	<u>30:6-31:11</u>
	February 6th, 2018, that	
	Cervantes's nursing license	
	had not been renewed since	
	November 2017, and she	
	learned this through a phone	
	call from the assistant clinical	
	manager, Miguel.	
	Marquez was unsure whether	31:14-25
	the phone call from Miguel was	51.11 25
	on her Kaiser phone or	
Talida Managada Danasa A	personal cell phone.	22.4.40
Talitha Marquez's Response to	During the phone call, Miguel	<u>32:1-18</u>
Discovery of Lapsed License	informed Marquez that	
and Inquiry into Notification	Cervantes's license had been	
Delay	expired since November 2017	
	and that he had verified the	
	inactive/suspended status on	
	the BRN website. Miguel also	
	mentioned that he had spoken	
	with Cervantes, who claimed	
	her license was valid and	
	electronic.	
	Following the phone call with	32:19-34:23
	Miguel, Marquez stated she	
	would also reach out to	
	Cervantes to verify the	
	situation.	
	Marquez questioned why she	34:24-35:7
	was only hearing about the	<u>51,21 55,7</u>
	lapsed license in February	
	when it had been expired since	
	November, and she was	
	surprised because two months	
	had passed without her	
	knowledge of the situation.	25.0.22
	Marquez did not know why	<u>35:8-23</u>
	she did not learn about the	
	lapsed license in January 2018,	
	attributing it to the fact that	
	notifications are courtesies	
	and not always received.	
Investigation into License	Marquez was aware of an	<u>35:24-36:18</u>
Renewal and Kaiser's Policies	incident at another Kaiser	
for Valid Licenses	facility, specifically in Orange	
	County, where an employee	
	worked on a suspended	
	license, which she learned	
	about from her HR consultant,	
	Kathy Hudson, after February	
	7th.	
	The investigation clarified why	<u>36:20-37:15</u>
	Cervantes did not renew her	
	license, revealing that she	
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	mistakenly believed it was	
	electronic and did not receive	
	a notification. It was	
	emphasized that it was	
	Cervantes's professional	
	responsibility to maintain her	
	license.	
	Marquez did not know if	37:16-39:1
	Cervantes received a courtesy	37.10 37.1
	notice regarding her license	
	renewal prior to November	
	2017, as she was not involved	
	with that unit during the	
	preceding months.	20.5.17
	Marquez did not have any	<u>39:7-16</u>
	information to dispute the	
	claim if Cervantes testified that	
	no courtesy notice was posted	
	prior to her license renewal in	
	November 2017.	
	Marquez stated that during the	<u>39:17-40:4</u>
	investigation, it was clear that	
	Cervantes did not follow up on	
	her professional responsibility	
	to maintain her license, as she	
	believed it was electronic but	
	did not verify it.	
	Marquez confirmed that	40:7-24
	Kaiser's policy requiring	10.7 = 1
	employees to have a valid	
	license to work legally was the	
	same at the time of the	
	deposition as it was during the	
	period in question.	
		40-25 41-12
	Kaiser had policies in place to	40:25-41:13
	ensure that nurses have valid	
	licenses, which included	
	courtesy notifications sent via	
	email and posted in break	
	rooms. However, it was the	
	professional responsibility of	
	the nurses to maintain their	
	licenses, not Kaiser's.	
Concerns about Reporting to	Marquez did not consider the	41:14-42:9
Outside Agencies and Kaiser's	possibility that Cervantes	
Self-Reporting Obligations	would report herself or Kaiser	
	to outside agencies for	
	allowing her to work without a	
	valid license.	
	Marquez was not aware of any	42:10-44:16
	instances where Kaiser self-	
	reported violations and did not	
	consider it her area of	
	knowledge.	
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	Marquez was concerned about	<u>44:17-45:21</u>
	potential violations and risks	
	to Kaiser, such as malpractice,	
	administering medications	
	without a license, and	
	violations of regulatory bodies,	
	which could result in fees and	
	fines.	
Manager Email Notifications	Kaiser has always had the	45:24-47:16
		45.24-47.10
and License Tracking System	ability to track employees' license status, but at some	
	,	
	point, they began a procedure	
	of sending this information via	
	email to managers.	
	Managers do not receive	<u>47:17-48:3</u>
	emails regarding employee	
	license status on a consistent	
	basis; it is not something that	
	is done consistently but rather	
	as a courtesy, with varying	
	notification times such as 30-	
	day or 60-day notices.	
Kaiser's Self-Reporting	Marquez has never learned of	48:4-12
Obligations and Compliance	any information that someone	10.1 12
Department Department	from Kaiser actually self-	
Department	reported violations.	
	Talitha Marquez is not aware	48:13-49:4
	of any instances where Kaiser	40.13-49.4
	self-reported violations.	40.7.22
	Marquez does not know if	<u>49:7-23</u>
	Kaiser is required to self-	
	report violations as it is not	
	within her area of expertise.	10.01.70.00
	The Compliance department is	<u>49:24-50:22</u>
	a separate entity from	
	Marquez's department, and	
	Lynn San Miguel heads up the	
	compliance department.	
Marquez's Role Transition and	Marquez did not learn about	<u>50:23-51:10</u>
Familiarity with License Status	Kaiser's tracking system for	
Communications	employees' licenses until she	
	became a manager, and she	
	does not know when the HR	
	track system was first	
	implemented.	
	Marquez first saw emails	51:11-19
	regarding nurses' licensing	
	status when she became an	
	unofficial manager	
	approximately two years ago	
	in June 2018.	
		<u>51:20-25</u>
	Marquez was familiar with	<u>51.20-25</u>
	emails regarding nurses'	
	license status because, even as	

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	an assistant clinical manager,	
	she would be forwarded those	
	emails and would post them in	
	the break rooms.	
Distribution List for License	Marquez's training for the	<u>52:3-53:1</u>
Status Emails and Managerial	interim manager position was	
Training	conducted by Gail Gillen, but	
	she does not recall how long	
	the training lasted.	
	Marquez was not on the	<u>53:2-15</u>
	distribution list for the emails	
	as a manager and did not	
	expect to be added	
	immediately due to the time it	
	takes for status changes to be	
	processed.	
	Marquez's role changed from	53:18-54:5
	assistant clinical manager to	
	house supervisor and then to	
	interim FSC manager, which	
	affected her inclusion in the	
	distribution list for the emails.	
HR Track System and	The HR track system sends	54:6-10
Notification Process	emails from the region to local	<u>5110 10</u>
Tvotification 1 10ccss	Kaisers, and the education	
	department helps manage it,	
	although they do not	
	technically oversee it.	
	The HR track emails include	54:11-16
	notifications of 30-day and 60-	<u>54.11-10</u>
	day expirations, as well as	
	expired licenses, as a courtesy,	
	but it is not a consistent	
	practice.	
Vaigar's Dalisy on Employee		E4.17 22
Kaiser's Policy on Employee License Maintenance and	Kaiser does not have a policy for notifying employees other	<u>54:17-23</u>
Manager's Responsibilities	than posting notifications in	
	the break room, and it is up to	
	the individual to maintain	
	their licenses and certificates.	E4.24 E6.0
	Marquez does not believe she	54:24-56:9
	has a duty to notify an	
	employee with an expired	
	license, although she does it as	
	a courtesy. She understands	
	that a manager can face	
	discipline when an employee	
	has their license expired, but	
	she is not sure if it is stated in	
	the policy.	
Managerial Discretion in	Marquez had discretion to	<u>56:10-57:1</u>
Disciplinary Actions and	determine the punishment for	
Termination Decisions	Roberta but collaborated with	
	Gail and the HR consultant,	

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	Kathy Hudson, to make the	
	final decision. She does not	
	believe she had discretion to	
	give Roberta a less severe	
	discipline due to the severity	
	of the situation.	
	The decision-makers involved	<u>57:2-15</u>
	in the termination of Roberta	
	were Marquez, Gail, and the	
	HR consultant, Kathy Hudson.	
Roberta's Awareness of	Marquez was concerned about	57:20-58:12
License Status and Marquez's	the potential discipline for	
Concerns	allowing Roberta Cervantes to	
	work on an expired license and	
	took actions such as contacting	
	compliance, the director, and	
	the chief nurse to address her	
	concerns.	
	Marquez believes that Roberta	58:13-25
	knowingly worked without a	
	valid license because she did	
	not follow up or check her	
	emails to confirm her license	
	status. Roberta admitted	
	during the fact-finding that she	
	never followed up and did not	
	know whether her license was	
	valid.	
Review and Distribution of	Talitha Marquez reviewed	59:1-6
License Expiration Memos	copies of the November and	57.1 0
Electise Expiration Fielios	December expiration memos	
	regarding license expiration.	
	Roberta's name was not on the	59:7-10
	December expiration memo,	37.7-10
	and Marquez did not know	
	-	
	Why.	F0.11 14
	Marquez was not on the distribution list for the	<u>59:11-14</u>
	December memo and only saw	
Avvananaga and Cna difficulting of	a copy of it.	E0.1E 22
Awareness and Specificity of	Marquez was aware of only	<u>59:15-23</u>
License Expiration	one November and one	
Communications	December memo or email	
	discussing license expiration.	50.24.60.E
	Marquez confirmed that there	<u>59:24-60:5</u>
	was no set timing for the	
	courtesy notifications about	
	license expirations.	60.645
	The local educational	60:6-17
	department would distribute	
	emails regarding license status	
	to assistant clinical managers,	
	but not consistently to specific	
İ	clinical managers.	

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	Emails regarding license status	<u>60:17-61:2</u>
	were not sent from the region	
	to the assistant clinical	
	managers directly but were	
	distributed by the local	
	educational department.	
Changes in License Expiration	The system for tracking license	<u>61:3-13</u>
Tracking System and	expiration changed around	
Marquez's Role	June 2018, with a list no longer	
	being distributed, and	
	Marquez was not part of the	
	decision to stop the list.	
	Marquez was not aware of the	<u>61:14-17</u>
	policy developed as a result of	
	Roberta's situation and did not	
	take part in the decision to	
	stop the list.	
	Marquez did not know if the	<u>61:18-21</u>
	decision to stop distributing	
	the list was related to	
	Roberta's situation.	
Marquez's Access to License	After the list was discontinued,	<u>61:22-62:9</u>
Status Reports and Personal	Marquez had direct access to a	
Monitoring Practices	report to learn about	
	employees' license status.	
	Marquez now has a link	<u>62:10-13</u>
	directly to a report to learn	
	about the license status of	
	employees.	
	Marquez used the HR track to	<u>62:14-20</u>
	monitor license status and had	
	a personal practice of checking	
	it at the end of each month for	
	upcoming expirations.	
	Marquez's personal practice	<u>62:21-63:7</u>
	includes pulling up a list of	
	employees whose licenses will	
	expire in the next two months	
	at the end of each month.	
	Marquez makes staff aware of	<u>63:8-14</u>
	upcoming license expirations	
	during daily huddles without	
	specifying names.	
Inquiries into Management's	Miguel was very shocked	63:19-64:3
Knowledge of Roberta's	during the conversation with	
Expired License	Marquez, leading her to	
	believe he was not previously	
	aware of Roberta's expired	
	license.	
	Marquez discussed with	<u>64:4-7</u>
	Miguel when he first learned	
	about Roberta's expired	
	license, which was on	

	February 6th when Roger	
	Christianson informed him.	44.0.40
	Marquez asked Gail if she	64:8-12
	knew about Roberta's expired	
	license, and Gail was not	
	aware.	
	Gail indicated that she let her	<u>64:13-15</u>
	assistant handle emails	
	regarding license expirations.	
	Miguel asserted that he did not	<u>64:16-19</u>
	have any information stating	
	Roberta's license was expired.	
Marquez's Roles and Email	Marquez's roles at Kaiser	64:24-65:21
Receipt as Assistant Clinical	included being a house	
Manager	supervisor, an assistant	
	clinical manager, and an	
	interim manager.	
	As an assistant clinical	65:22-66:4
	manager, Marquez did not	
	directly receive emails about	
	license status but could be	
	forwarded such emails by	
	other managers.	
	Marquez received emails	66:5-11
	about license status from Gail	00.3-11
	and Roger while she was an	
	assistant clinical manager.	
		66:12-15
	Marquez was not aware of any	00:12-15
	specific actions or actual harm	
	caused by Roberta's license	
D: 1 . II . I	violation to Kaiser.	66.46.05
Discussions about Kaiser's	Marquez was not aware of any	<u>66:16-25</u>
Potential Liability and	actual harm or liability caused	
Consequences for License	by Roberta Cervantes's license	
Violations	violation to Kaiser.	
	Marquez did not believe that	<u>67:1-13</u>
	terminating Roberta Cervantes	
	eliminated any liability on the	
	part of Kaiser.	
	Marquez stated that part of the	<u>67:14-68:11</u>
	reason for Roberta's	
	termination was the lack of	
	sense in Roberta's explanation	
	and her admission of not	
	checking her emails.	
	Marquez believed that Roberta	68:12-24
	was fired due to the	
	investigation and Roberta's	
	own statements during fact-	
	finding, not solely because of	
	the risk she posed to Kaiser.	
	Marquez was not part of any	68:25-69:6
	discussions about reporting	33.25 3710
	the license violation to the	
	the nectise violation to the	

	BRN and believed the	
	termination was due to	
	Roberta's own actions and	
	statements.	
	Marquez knew that the Joint	69:7-19
	Commission ensures hospitals	<u> </u>
	meet standards and that	
	regulatory practices are in	
	place, but she was not familiar	
	with the specific consequences	
II 1 . 1: C	of violations.	60.20.24
Understanding of	Marquez was not involved in	69:20-24
Accreditation Requirements	discussions regarding	
and Consequences for	potential consequences for	
Violations	Kaiser from accreditation	
	bureaus like the Joint	
	Commission.	
	Marquez knew that the Joint	<u>69:25-70:8</u>
	Commission required nurses	
	to be licensed and that there	
	could be fines for violations,	
	but was not specific about the	
	consequences.	
	Marquez stated that the	70:9-15
	discipline for working with an	
	expired license would be the	
	same regardless of whether it	
	was for one day or a longer	
	period.	
Discipline Consistency for	Marquez acknowledged that	70:16-20
Working with an Expired	working with an expired	70.10 20
License and Investigation	license could result in the	
Details	same discipline regardless of	
Details	the duration of the violation.	
		70.21 24
	Marquez was aware of the new	70:21-24
	fingerprinting requirement	
	that was communicated to	
	nurses, including through	
	union flyers.	
	Marquez understood that	<u>70:25-71:5</u>
	there was a new fingerprinting	
	requirement in 2017, but it	
	was not for everyone and was	
	specific to when the last	
	fingerprints were done.	
Marquez's Knowledge of	Marquez knew about the new	<u>71:6-17</u>
Fingerprinting Requirement	fingerprinting requirement	
and Responsibility for	and emphasized that it was the	
Licensure	nurse's responsibility to stay	
	current with licensure, not the	
	employer's.	
	Marquez logged into the BRN	71:18-22
	in 2018 and saw the big yellow	
	banner about the	
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	fingerprinting requirement,	
	but did not recall doing so in	
	2017.	
	Talitha Marquez was not	<u>71:23-72:11</u>
	aware if the union	
	representative specifically	
	spoke with Roberta about the	
	need for additional	
	fingerprints.	
Union Representative	Marquez acknowledged that	72:12-74:8
Communication and	while it was a generalized	
Knowledge of Roberta's	statement that all nurses at	
Situation	FCC should have known about	
Situation	the union postings regarding	
	additional fingerprints, she did	
	not have specific knowledge	
	about Roberta seeing those	
	postings. Marguez confirmed that the	74:9-17
	Marquez confirmed that the	<u>/4.7-1/</u>
	union posted information	
	about the need for additional	
	fingerprints in the break room	
	and on boards at the hospital	
	entrance, and that the union	
	treasurer, who worked in FCC,	
	had more knowledge than	
	others.	
	Marquez confirmed that she	<u>74:18-20</u>
	did not know whether Roberta	
	ever saw the union's postings.	
	Marquez did not know if the	<u>74:21-75:3</u>
	link to check license status for	
	employees was available to	
	managers before June 2018, as	
	she was not a manager at that	
	time.	
	Marquez stated that she did	<u>75:4-19</u>
	not make any judgment call as	
	to whether Roberta was telling	
	the truth when she said she	
	thought her license was valid	
	and that she had properly	
	renewed her license.	
	Marquez, Gail, and Miguel	75:20-76:10
	were not aware of the	
	expiration of Roberta's license	
	prior to February 6th, 2018,	
	but believed they should have	
	known.	
	She did not make a judgment	76:11-17
	call on whether Roberta was	
	telling the truth about thinking	
	her license was valid and	
	believed Roberta did not know	
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	her license had expired but	
	should have known.	76.40.00
	Marquez believed that Gail,	<u>76:18-23</u>
	herself, or Miguel should have	
	known about the expiration of	
	Roberta's license prior to	
	February 6th, 2018, but also	
	stated that it was not their	
	responsibility.	
	Marquez confirmed she has	<u>76:24-77:5</u>
	never been convicted of a	
	felony and acknowledged the	
	awkwardness of being asked	
	such questions in depositions.	
Talitha Marquez's	Marquez is an expert witness	<u>77:6-12</u>
Participation in Previous	in two lawsuits but is not	
Depositions and Awareness of	named specifically for	
Other Lawsuits	something she has done.	
	She was not aware of any	77:13-15
	other ongoing claims for	
	wrongful terminations at	
	Kaiser.	
	Marquez did not have an	77:16-22
	understanding of why	
	Roberta's license expired and	
	stated that the reason for the	
	expiration was not a factor in	
	her termination decision.	
	Marquez did not know the	77:23-78:14
	specific reason why Roberta's	77.23 70.11
	license expired and stated that	
	it was up to the employee to	
	disclose why their license	
	expired.	
		78-15-10
	Marquez assumed that Roberta had a valid license,	<u>78:15-19</u>
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	just as Roberta assumed she	
	had a valid license.	70.20 70.2
	She felt that Roberta was	<u>78:20-79:2</u>
	irresponsible for not checking	
	her emails and validating her	
	license status.	70.2 0
	Marquez stated that there is no	<u>79:3-8</u>
	such thing as an electronic	
	card, contradicting Roberta's	
	claim of having one.	T0 10 00 01
	Marquez mentioned that the	<u>79:12-80:24</u>
	process of receiving a physical	
	card for license renewal had	
	changed to electronic several	
	years ago and that she had not	
	received a physical card for	
	many years.	
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	Marquez became aware of	80:25-81:7
	another employee, Mel, whose	
	license expired in June 2020	
	and disciplined him with a	
	suspension without pay.	
Disciplinary Actions and	Marquez learned about her	<u>81:8-83:11</u>
Management Responsibilities	employee Mel's license	
	expiration on the last day of	
	June 2020, and he was	
	disciplined with a suspension	
	without pay for approximately	
	11 days until he provided a	
	valid license.	
	She had the discretion to	83:12-23
	discipline Roberta with a	
	suspension without pay, which	
	was initially decided upon but	
	later changed to paid	
	suspension after consulting	
	with HR for a full investigation.	
	Marquez stated that it is not a	83:24-84:8
	daily function of a manager to	
	validate an employee's license	
	every day.	
	The decision to change	84:9-85:15
	Roberta's suspension from	
	without pay to with pay was	
	made in collaboration with the	
	HR consultant to complete a	
	full and fair investigation.	
	The initial decision to suspend	85:16-20
	Roberta without pay was made	
	by Marquez after consulting	
	with either Gail or the HR	
	consultant, Kathy Hudson.	
	Marquez indicated that the	85:21-86:14
	decision to suspend Roberta	
	with pay was made to ensure a	
	fair investigation could be	
	completed.	
	Marquez could have told	86:15-25
	Roberta that she might be	
	terminated if she did not	
	renew her license within 14	
	days, as per policy.	
	Marquez did not recall	87:1-21
	specifically how she first	
	notified Roberta of her	
	suspension without pay but	
	stated it had to be on the	
	phone since it was in the	
	evening.	
	evening.	