

# Decolonizing Linguistic Policies in Speech AI: A Framework for Cross-Culturally Competent Systems

Anonymous submission to Interspeech 2026

## Abstract

Speech AI increasingly mediates access to public services, healthcare, and education, yet it routinely fails speakers of low-resource, Indigenous, and non-standard language varieties. We argue these failures are not merely technical but reflect implicit linguistic policies that reproduce colonial language hierarchies. Drawing on Bourdieu’s linguistic capital, racio-linguistic ideology, and decolonial computing, we show how choices in training data, evaluation metrics, and language model priors operate as political acts that determine whose voices become machine-legible. We introduce the Three Harms (3M) taxonomy—Misrecognition, Misalignment, and Mistrust—to capture failure modes beyond word error rate. We then propose a Participatory Framework for Culturally Competent Speech AI: participatory auditing, community co-design, equitable deployment, and feedback integration, positioning Global South communities as co-designers rather than passive targets of inclusion.

**Index Terms:** speech recognition, linguistic bias, de-colonial AI, low-resource languages, participatory design, cultural competence

## 1. Introduction

Speech AI systems now mediate access to public services, healthcare, education, and legal processes, yet they routinely fail speakers of low-resource, indigenous, and non-standard varieties [1, 2]. These failures are not isolated bugs: they are the predictable outcomes of how systems define which voices are legible to machines, with material consequences ranging from denied access to the indignity of being rendered unintelligible [3, 4]. We argue that the core issue is structural, not incidental.

We term these structural decisions **linguistic policies**: the explicit and implicit design rules that govern (i) *data* (which languages, dialects, and speaking contexts are collected and labeled), (ii) *metrics* (what counts as “correct” and how error is weighted across speakers), and (iii) *priors* (the language-model assumptions that privilege certain speech patterns). These policies reproduce colonial hierarchies of linguistic value by embedding prestige norms into the pipeline [5, 6].

This paper makes four contributions:

- We provide a theoretical account of linguistic policies in speech AI, synthesizing linguistic capital theory, racio-linguistic ideology, and de-colonial computing to explain why exclusion is produced by design choices rather than mere data scarcity [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12].
- We introduce a Seven-layer Situatedness Model for Linguistic Diversity in Speech AI. Moving upward adds socio-technical context; colonial linguistic hierarchies shape what is treated as “standard,” “supported,” and “valuable.

- We introduce the Three Harms (3M) taxonomy: Misrecognition, Misalignment, and Mistrust, to capture failure modes that are invisible to WER-focused evaluation.
- We formalize a Participatory Framework for Culturally Competent Speech AI that reassigns design authority to affected language communities.
- We connect community-led initiatives across the Global South to a replicable design methodology that operationalizes cultural competence in speech AI.

## 2. Theoretical Foundations

Our analysis integrates three intellectual traditions that, together, illuminate the political architecture of speech AI: linguistic capital theory, racio-linguistic ideology, and de-colonial computing.

### 2.1. Linguistic Capital and Market Value

Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of *linguistic capital* provides a structural account of why certain language varieties are treated as more valuable than others [7]. For Bourdieu, language operates within a “linguistic market” where utterances are evaluated not solely by their communicative content but by their symbolic alignment with dominant norms. Speakers of high-resources varieties such as Standard American English, Metropolitan French, and European Portuguese or Peninsular Spanish as colonial reference standards, accumulate linguistic capital that converts into social, economic, and institutional power. Speakers of marginalized varieties (e.g., Brazilian Portuguese in its regional and Afro-Brazilian forms, or Latin American Spanish in its diverse national (Mexican, Dominican, Colombian) and Indigenous-contact varieties) face a “symbolic tax”: their speech is devalued, misheard, or ignored [13, 14].

Speech AI systems operationalize Bourdieu’s linguistic market in algorithmic form. When an ASR system achieves a 5% WER for Standard American English but a 35% WER for African American Language [3], or when a voice assistant supports Parisian French but not Senegalese French, it is not merely reflecting data availability, it is *reproducing* the market valuation of these language varieties. The training data itself encodes market position: languages with high institutional power (English, Mandarin, Standard Spanish) are overrepresented in digital corpora, while languages with lower institutional power (Wolof, Igbo, Akan) remain “low-resource”—a term that obscures the political economies of neglect that produced the resource gap [15].

**How does a language become “low-resource”?** To avoid treating “low-resource” as a monolithic label, we draw on Joshi et al.’s six-class taxonomy of linguistic inclusion, which parti-

94 tions the world’s languages by their digital and NLP resource  
95 profiles [16]. The taxonomy ranges from **(0) Left-Behinds**  
96 (e.g., Dahalo, Warlpiri, Popoloca, Wallisian, Bora) through **(1)**  
97 **Scraping-Bys** (e.g., Cherokee, Fijian, Greenlandic, Bhojpuri,  
98 Navajo) and **(2) Hopefuls** (e.g., Zulu, Konkani, Lao, Mal-  
99 tese, Irish), to **(3) Rising Stars** (e.g., Indonesian, Ukrainian,  
100 Cebuano, Afrikaans, Hebrew), **(4) Underdogs** (e.g., Russian,  
101 Hungarian, Vietnamese, Dutch, Korean), and **(5) Winners** (e.g.,  
102 English, Spanish, German, Japanese, French) [16]. We use this  
103 breakdown as a descriptive measure of how resource alloca-  
104 tion and research attention are distributed, and as motivation  
105 for why culturally competent speech AI must address not only  
106 data scarcity but also the political and institutional conditions  
107 that determine which language varieties become “supported” in  
108 the first place. Importantly, our claim is that speech AI systems  
109 often inherit the value judgments embedded in these resource  
110 tiers, treating “Winners” as normative and pushing culturally  
111 situated speech patterns in other classes into misrecognition,  
112 misalignment, and mistrust.

## 113 2.2. Racio-linguistic Ideologies in Technology

114 Rosa and Flores’s *racio-linguistic* framework extends this anal-  
115 ysis by demonstrating how perceptions of language are in-  
116 extricable from perceptions of racialized bodies [8]. The  
117 “white listening subject”—their term for the dominant percep-  
118 tional stance that positions white, middle-class language practices  
119 as neutral—does not merely hear language differently; it *con-*  
120 *strues* the speech of racialized speakers as deficient regardless  
121 of its linguistic content [9]. This is not a failure of listening ac-  
122 curacy but an ideological orientation that treats some speakers  
123 as inherently less intelligible.

124 We propose that speech AI systems function as *algorithmic*  
125 *listening subjects* that encode racio-linguistic ideologies at  
126 scale. When ASR systems are trained on datasets that dispro-  
127 portionately represent standard varieties, when pronunciation  
128 models are benchmarked against prestige norms, and when er-  
129 ror tolerance thresholds are calibrated to dominant-group per-  
130 formance, the resulting system “listens” through the same ide-  
131 ological lens that Flores and Rosa describe [9]. The system does  
132 not hear what is spoken; it hears what it has been designed to  
133 recognize as speech. Lippi-Green’s foundational work on lin-  
134 guistic discrimination demonstrates how such ideological ori-  
135 entations operate in institutions from courts to classrooms [17];  
136 speech AI extends this discrimination into automated infrastruc-  
137 ture.

## 138 2.3. De-colonial Computing

139 De-colonial computing provides the third pillar. Ali frames  
140 de-colonial computing as a critical orientation that interrogates  
141 how coloniality—the enduring structures of colonial power—  
142 persists within computational systems, epistemologies, and de-  
143 sign practices [10]. Irani et al.’s postcolonial computing lens  
144 reveals how technology design naturalizes Western epistemolo-  
145 gies while rendering other knowledge systems invisible or defi-  
146 cient [11]. Dourish and Mainwaring expose the “colonial im-  
147 pulse” in ubiquitous computing, where systems designed for  
148 Western contexts are deployed globally with minimal adapta-  
149 tion [18].

150 Mohamed et al. synthesize these insights into a framework  
151 for de-colonial AI, identifying algorithmic exploitation, algo-  
152 rithmic dispossession, and the imposition of dominant episte-  
153 mologies as key mechanisms through which AI systems perpet-  
154 uate colonial relations [12]. We build on this framework to ar-

155 gue that speech AI represents a particularly acute site of colonial  
156 continuity: language was a primary instrument of colonial gov-  
157 ernance [5, 19, 6], and speech AI systems that privilege colo-  
158 nial languages while marginalizing indigenous ones extend this  
159 governance into digital infrastructure.

## 160 2.4. The Digital Language Divide

161 These theoretical frameworks converge in what Joshi et al. docu-  
162 ment as the “digital language divide” [4]. Their taxonomy  
163 classifies the world’s languages into categories from “The Win-  
164 ners” (a handful of languages with extensive NLP resources)  
165 to “The Left-Behinds” (thousands of languages with virtually  
166 no digital presence). Blasi et al. demonstrate that language  
167 technology performance correlates not with linguistic complex-  
168 ity but with socioeconomic power: the languages that perform  
169 worst in NLP systems are spoken by the world’s most econom-  
170 ically marginalized populations [20]. This is not a coincidence;  
171 it is, as Couldry and Mejias argue, a form of *data colonialism*  
172 in which the extraction of value from data reproduces colonial  
173 patterns of dispossession [21].

174 The convergence of linguistic capital theory, racio-  
175 linguistic ideology, and de-colonial computing reveals that  
176 speech AI’s exclusions are not merely the product of “insuffi-  
177 cient data” awaiting technical remediation. They are the algo-  
178 rithmic expression of centuries-old hierarchies of linguistic and  
179 racial value. Addressing them requires not only more data but  
180 fundamentally different relationships between speech systems  
181 and the communities they purport to serve.

182 To make this layered structure explicit, we introduce a  
183 seven-layer situatedness model (Figure 1) that links language,  
184 nation, region, ethno-linguistic identity, ideology, justice, and  
185 socio-technical implications. This model clarifies why “sup-  
186 porting a language” is never a single technical task: it requires  
187 attending to layered social and political conditions that shape  
188 intelligibility and harm.

## 189 3. Positionality Statement

190 In alignment with Haraway’s account of *situated knowledges*  
191 and the privilege of partial perspective [22] and Suchman’s for-  
192 mulation of *located accountabilities* in technology production  
193 [23], we view this paper as shaped by our standpoints as re-  
194 searchers whose identities, linguistic communities, and insti-  
195 tutional locations condition what we notice as harm, what we  
196 treat as evidence, and what we imagine as responsible interven-  
197 tion. We do not claim neutrality: our analysis of “linguistic  
198 policies” in speech AI is informed by the ways language hier-  
199 archies are lived and enforced through schooling, institutions,  
200 markets, and everyday interactions, and by our recognition that  
201 speech and language technologies can reproduce these hierar-  
202 chies when they privilege prestige norms.

203 Our author team brings lived and scholarly experience  
204 across multiple language communities that sit in different re-  
205 lations to colonial and postcolonial language power, including  
206 African American English (AAVE) and other Afro-diasporic  
207 English varieties of North America and the Caribbean, Brazil-  
208 ian Portuguese and its social/ethnic variations plus indige-  
209 nous language use, Nigerian-English plus Yorùbá and Ìgbò  
210 tribal languages, Mexican/Latin American Spanish varieties,  
211 and Ghanaian-English plus Twi and Akan tribal languages. This  
212 range of linguistic and cultural standpoints is central to the pa-  
213 per’s argument that cultural competence cannot be reduced to  
214 language-level “coverage” or aggregate accuracy. It also in-




Figure 1: A seven-layer situatedness model for linguistic diversity in speech AI. Moving upward adds socio-technical context; colonial linguistic hierarchies shape what is treated as “standard,” “supported,” and “valuable.”

forms our emphasis on harms that exceed transcription error, including pragmatic and cultural misalignment and the downstream mistrust that follows from repeated system failure.

Our standpoints also shape our methodological commitments. First, our approach prioritizes community-led and regionally grounded language technology efforts (e.g., pan-African and local NLP initiatives, and Global South research networks) as sites of expertise rather than peripheral “data sources.” Second, our proposed participatory framework reflects a normative stance: affected language communities should be treated as co-designers and co-auditors of speech AI systems, with meaningful influence over evaluation criteria, deployment conditions, and pathways for repair and redress. Finally, we recognize that positionality is not resolved through disclosure alone. We therefore treat this statement as an accountability mechanism: a reminder that our claims are partial, that our recommendations must remain responsive to community critique, and that the work ahead requires sustained collaboration beyond what any single paper can represent.

We also acknowledge that we write from university institutions in North America, which shape access to publication venues, resources, and legitimacy; this paper therefore aims to amplify and remain accountable to Global South knowledge-making rather than treat it as supplementary.

Table 1: How to spot linguistic policies in speech AI: sites of decision-making and observable signals.

Policy site	Concrete signals
Training data	Benchmark composition skews toward prestige languages; crowdsourcing excludes rural or low-connectivity speakers.
Training data	Transcription guidelines enforce standardized orthography over local spellings or code-switching.
Metrics	Primary evaluation uses WER without domain- or community-specific weighting.
Metrics	“Ground truth” assumes a single correct transcript despite multiple legitimate variants.
Model priors	Language model favors monolingual sequences; code-switching is penalized.
Model priors	Normalization rules remove honorifics or politeness markers as “noise.”
Deployment	Refusal or fallback behavior defaults to English-only responses for unsupported varieties.

## 4. Linguistic Policies as Design Choices

We define **linguistic policies in speech AI** as the explicit and implicit design decisions that govern which language varieties a system supports, how it evaluates correctness, and what constitutes intelligible speech. These policies operate at three interconnected levels: data, metrics, and modeling.

Table 1 provides a compact diagnostic for identifying where linguistic policies are enacted in practice and how they surface in system behavior. This diagnostic is not exhaustive, but it makes policy sites visible and actionable for audit and redesign.

### 4.1. Training Data Curation as Policy

The selection, sourcing, and annotation of training data constitute the most consequential linguistic policy decisions in speech AI. When developers prioritize publicly available speech corpora, which overwhelmingly represent English, Mandarin, and a small number of European languages [4], they enact a policy of linguistic triage that mirrors colonial hierarchies. The term “low-resource language” obscures the political economy of this resource distribution: these languages are not inherently resource-poor; they have been *made* resource-poor through centuries of institutional marginalization [15].

Consider the historical production of this “scarcity.” English was imposed upon ethnic Africans in Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya, and South Africa—nations that each possess rich arrays of native languages such as Akan, Ga, Swahili, and Zulu. Spanish was forced upon Indigenous Americans and enslaved Africans in the Caribbean. Portuguese was imposed upon Indigenous and Afro-Brazilian populations. French was enforced across West African nations including Senegal and Ivory Coast, and in Haiti [5, 6]. These colonial languages subsequently became the languages of digital infrastructure, institutional documentation, and academic publishing, which are the very sources from which training corpora are derived. When a speech AI system is “trained on available data,” it is trained on the documentary legacy of colonial language dominance.

274 **4.2. Evaluation Metrics as Policy**

275 Word Error Rate (WER) remains the dominant metric for ASR  
 276 evaluation, yet its use as a primary measure of system qual-  
 277 ity enacts its own linguistic policy. WER treats all word-level  
 278 errors as equivalent, irrespective of their communicative or so-  
 279 cial consequences. It cannot capture whether a transcription  
 280 error changes the meaning of an utterance, whether it renders  
 281 a speaker’s intent unintelligible, or whether it has differential  
 282 consequences in high-stakes contexts such as healthcare or le-  
 283 gal proceedings [24].

284 Moreover, WER presupposes a “correct” transcription,  
 285 which necessarily reflects a standardized orthography and a  
 286 prestige language norm. For languages and dialects without  
 287 a standardized written form, or for speakers who code-switch  
 288 between multiple varieties, the concept of “ground truth” tran-  
 289 scription is itself contested. When ASR systems are evaluated  
 290 against reference transcriptions produced by speakers of stan-  
 291 dard varieties, the evaluation metric becomes a mechanism for  
 292 enforcing linguistic conformity as a measurement instrument  
 293 that encodes the values it purports to neutrally assess [25].

294 **4.3. Language Model Priors as Policy**

295 Language models embedded in speech AI systems encode as-  
 296 sumptions about what constitutes “probable” speech. These pri-  
 297 ors are often learned from text corpora that share the same rep-  
 298 resentational biases as speech training data, then assign higher  
 299 probability to utterances that conform to dominant language  
 300 patterns. A Swahili speaker in Nairobi who code-switches be-  
 301 tween Swahili and English receives lower confidence scores not  
 302 because their speech is less fluent but because the model as-  
 303 signs lower probability to mixed-language sequences. An Akan  
 304 speaker whose speech includes tonal distinctions absent from  
 305 the model’s phonemic inventory is systematically “corrected”  
 306 toward the nearest English approximation.

307 These three levels of linguistic policy: data curation, metric  
 308 selection, and model priors, interact to produce a system that  
 309 does not merely fail to recognize certain voices; it *actively pro-*  
 310 *duces* certain voices as unrecognizable. This is the de-colonial  
 311 insight: the exclusion is not the absence of inclusion but the  
 312 presence of a normative order that constitutes some speech as  
 313 unintelligible by design.

314 **5. The Three Harms: Misrecognition,  
 315 Misalignment, and Mistrust**

316 Conventional evaluation of speech AI focuses primarily on tran-  
 317 scription accuracy (e.g., WER), but this captures only one di-  
 318 mension of harm and often mis-specifies what counts as failure  
 319 in multilingual, culturally situated use. In broader NLP, repre-  
 320 sentational and allocational harms have been used to describe  
 321 how systems reinforce stereotypes or distribute resources un-  
 322 evenly [26, 27]. The 3M taxonomy translates these insights into  
 323 speech-specific, cross-cultural failure modes that are grounded  
 324 in how people are heard, understood, and trusted in real interac-  
 325 tion.

326 Drawing on the theoretical foundations outlined above,  
 327 we introduce a taxonomy of three interrelated harms, the **3M**  
 328 **framework**, which captures the full spectrum of ways speech  
 329 AI systems fail Global South language communities.

330 Table 2 summarizes the 3M taxonomy as a diagnostic in-  
 331 strument: each failure mode implies distinct evaluation proto-  
 332 cols and distinct design interventions.

Table 2: *The 3M taxonomy operationalized: definitions, how to detect, and why it matters.*

Failure mode	What it is	How to detect / measure	Downstream harm
<b>Misrecognition</b>	The system fails to produce an accurate transcript or intent (e.g., deletions/substitutions, refusals).	WER/CER; refusal rate; intent error; subgroup error gaps; acoustic condition sensitivity.	Denied access, delayed service, exclusion from voice-mediated infrastructure (health, safety, education).
<b>Misalignment</b>	The system produces plausible output but <i>misinterprets meaning</i> in culturally situated speech (idioms, honorifics, indirectness, code-switching).	Pragmatic adequacy ratings; culturally grounded eval sets; meaning-vs-wording annotation; implicature checks.	Loss of dignity, safety risks, harmful “corrections” toward prestige norms; cultural erasure through normalization.
<b>Mistrust</b>	Relational harm: users disengage because the system feels unreliable, disrespectful, or surveillant.	Abandonment/turn-taking breakdown; trust/agency scales; qualitative interviews; complaint logs; opt-out rates.	Feedback loop: reduced usage reduces repair signals, widening performance gaps and discouraging adoption.

333 **5.1. Misrecognition**

334 Misrecognition encompasses the most visible failures: incor-  
 335 rect transcriptions, dropped words, wrong-speaker attributions,  
 336 and complete non-recognition (where the system produces no  
 337 output at all). While WER captures some of these failures,  
 338 misrecognition extends beyond word-level errors to include sys-  
 339 tematic patterns of erasure. Koenecke et al. found that five ma-  
 340 jor ASR systems exhibited average WER differences of approx-  
 341 imately 16 percentage points between African American and  
 342 White speakers [3]. Martin and Tang document how these dis-  
 343 parities persist and compound for speakers of African American  
 344 Language [28].

345 For Global South language communities, misrecognition  
 346 operates at an even more fundamental level. Speakers of Wolof,  
 347 Igbo, or Haitian Creole encounter systems that do not merely  
 348 misrecognize their speech; they encounter systems that deny the  
 349 existence of their language as a supported category. This cate-  
 350 gorical exclusion, which is often the system’s refusal to even  
 351 *attempt* recognition, is a distinct form of misrecognition that  
 352 WER cannot measure because there is no output to evaluate.

353 **5.2. Misalignment**

354 Misalignment occurs when a system produces a plausible tran-  
 355 scription or response but *misinterprets meaning* in culturally sit-  
 356 uated speech. The words may be “right” while the intended  
 357 force, social positioning, or referent is wrong; this makes mis-  
 358 alignment invisible to WER and other surface-form metrics.  
 359 Because it reflects mismatches in pragmatics and cultural con-  
 360 text, misalignment is a key cross-cultural harm in speech AI

361 [29].

362 Three illustrative cases make this concrete. First, *idiomatic*  
363 *misalignment*: a Twi speaker uses “*wo maame awō wo*” (lit-  
364 erally “your mother gave birth to you”) as admiration, but the  
365 system renders it as a literal or offensive statement. Second,  
366 *honorific misalignment*: a Hindi speaker contrasts “*aap*” (for-  
367 mal you) with “*tum*” (informal you) to signal respect; collaps-  
368 ing these forms removes socially consequential meaning. Third,  
369 *code-switching misalignment*: multilingual speakers routinely  
370 mix languages within a single utterance [30]; systems that force  
371 a single-language interpretation erase the communicative strat-  
372 egy and can change intent.

373 Detecting misalignment requires evaluation methods that  
374 go beyond transcription accuracy. We propose three comple-  
375 mentary approaches: (i) *pragmatic adequacy* ratings, where  
376 community evaluators judge whether the system captured in-  
377 tended meaning and social stance; (ii) *culturally grounded eval-*  
378 *uation sets* that include idioms, honorifics, register shifts, and  
379 locally salient frames; and (iii) *implicature/intent checks* that  
380 test whether the system preserves implied meaning rather than  
381 only literal wording. These methods make misalignment mea-  
382 surable without reducing it to WER.

### 383 5.3. Mistrust

384 Mistrust is the experiential and relational harm that accrues  
385 when communities perceive, albeit correctly, that a speech AI  
386 system was not designed for them. It manifests in interactional  
387 signals such as abandonment, repeated corrections, opt-out be-  
388 havior, and the choice to route around voice interfaces entirely.  
389 Mengesha et al. show that speakers of stigmatized English di-  
390 alects often frame assistants as “not very intelligent,” a coping  
391 strategy that nonetheless signals erosion of trust [31].

392 Mistrust creates an adoption and repair loop that worsens  
393 inequity. As users disengage, systems receive fewer error cor-  
394 rections and less representative interaction data; this reduces  
395 performance for the very groups already underserved, further  
396 deepening mistrust. In practice, mistrust is therefore not only a  
397 perception problem but a structural mechanism that entrenches  
398 initial exclusion.

399 Mistrust also has a surveillance edge case. For communities  
400 with histories of state or corporate monitoring, speech systems  
401 can be perceived as tools of extraction or control, even when  
402 they function accurately. In such contexts, “working” systems  
403 can still be rejected on safety and dignity grounds, especially if  
404 always-on listening, data retention, or unclear consent processes  
405 are present [32]. Designing for cultural competence therefore  
406 requires recognizing mistrust as a rational response to surveil-  
407 lance risk, not a defect in user attitudes.

408 The 3M taxonomy is designed to be *additive*, not substitutive:  
409 it complements WER and other quantitative metrics rather  
410 than replacing them. Its value lies in making visible the dimen-  
411 sions of harm that technical metrics alone cannot capture, and  
412 in grounding evaluation in the experiences of the communities  
413 affected by speech AI’s linguistic policies.

## 414 6. Community-Led Responses and Existing Efforts

415  
416 The theoretical critique advanced above is not merely academic;  
417 it is animated by existing community-driven initiatives that are  
418 already building alternatives to extractive speech AI develop-  
419 ment. These initiatives demonstrate that Global South language  
420 communities are not passive recipients of technological inclu-

421 sion but active co-designers of speech systems grounded in their  
422 own linguistic and cultural contexts.

423 **Masakhane**, a pan-African grassroots research collective,  
424 has organized hundreds of researchers across the continent to  
425 develop NLP tools for African languages through participatory  
426 methods [33]. Rather than waiting for major technology com-  
427 panies to address African language representation, Masakhane  
428 members build datasets, train models, and establish evaluation  
429 standards rooted in community needs. The initiative embodies  
430 a *reciprocal* model of development in which communities re-  
431 tain ownership over their linguistic data and shape the research  
432 agenda.

433 **UGSpeechData** provides approximately 5,000 hours of  
434 validated speech across five Ghanaian languages, Akan, Ewe,  
435 Dagbani, Dagaare, and Ikposo [34]. The corpus was assembled  
436 through controlled crowdsourcing (a curated data-collection  
437 workflow with screening and expert validation), with distinct  
438 roles for speakers, validators, and transcribers [34]. Indigenous  
439 speakers contributed spontaneous image descriptions through  
440 a purpose-built Android application; recordings were screened  
441 and then evaluated by proficient speakers and language experts  
442 using multi-rater checks with defined conflict-resolution steps  
443 [34]. To support automatic speech recognition (ASR, the task of  
444 converting speech audio into text) and related analyses, a sub-  
445 set of validated audio was selected for transcription, reported  
446 as roughly 10% per language, which corresponds to about 100  
447 hours per language, alongside language-appropriate input tool-  
448 ing, including customised keyboard support for orthographies  
449 that are not well served by standard layouts [34]. This example  
450 may suggest that resource constraints in Global South speech AI  
451 are not only a matter of volume; the more persistent limitation  
452 often appears to be the availability of governance processes that  
453 sustain quality and community legitimacy as datasets grow [34].  
454 It also offers a practical pathway for aligning dataset construc-  
455 tion with local language practices, whereas many widely used  
456 benchmarks remain shaped by assumptions that fit dominant-  
457 language norms more readily than multilingual community use.

458 Beyond dataset construction, **GhanaNLP has also opera-**  
459 **tionalized Ghanaian language technologies in public-facing**  
460 **systems** that foreground everyday utility. For example, the  
461 *Khaya* application supports translation and (in recent iterations)  
462 speech capabilities for Ghanaian and other African languages,  
463 providing an accessible interface layer through which speakers  
464 can interact with models in culturally familiar terms [35, 36].  
465 GhanaNLP also curates public repositories of language re-  
466 sources and models for Ghanaian languages (e.g., Akan, Dag-  
467 bani, Ga), lowering the barrier for local experimentation and  
468 educational adoption [37]. Importantly, these initiatives rein-  
469 force our claim that “inclusion” is not only a matter of adding  
470 languages to corporate roadmaps, but of building *locally legible*  
471 language infrastructure: interfaces, governance practices, and  
472 maintenance pathways that allow communities to shape how  
473 speech AI is accessed, evaluated, and iteratively improved.

474 **AI4Bharat** has developed open-source language technol-  
475 ogy infrastructure for Indian languages, including the Indic-  
476 NLP Suite of corpora, benchmarks, and pretrained models [38].  
477 This initiative addresses the digital language divide for South  
478 Asian languages by building public infrastructure that any re-  
479 searcher or developer can use, avoiding the proprietary enclo-  
480 sures that characterize much of the speech AI industry.

481 **Mozilla Common Voice** provides an open platform for  
482 community-contributed speech data across more than 100 lan-  
483 guages [39]. Its contribution model, where speakers voluntarily  
484 record and validate utterances, offers one pathway to address

485 data scarcity, although scholars have noted the need for stronger  
486 governance mechanisms to ensure that community data are not  
487 extracted for commercial purposes without reciprocal benefit  
488 [40].

489 **In Kenya, researchers at Microsoft Research Africa are**  
490 **advancing work on Kenyan and Swahili tribal languages,**  
491 **building culturally grounded language technologies that priori-**  
492 **tize local knowledge systems. Lesan.ai is developing machine**  
493 **translation for Ethiopian languages, addressing one of the most**  
494 **linguistically diverse regions in the world.**

495 **Workshops, institutes, and dataset challenges as ecosys-**  
496 **tem infrastructure.** Community capacity-building also occurs  
497 through venues that make African language work visible and  
498 citable. The *AfricaNLP* workshop series explicitly frames “un-  
499 locking local languages” as a research and community agenda,  
500 helping consolidate shared tasks, norms, and networks for  
501 African NLP [41]. Complementing workshops, practitioner-led  
502 institutes such as the Niger-Volta Language Technologies Insti-  
503 tute develop speech and language resources for West African  
504 languages (e.g., ASR, language identification, and datasets for  
505 Yorùbá) through open repositories and community partnerships  
506 [42, 43]. Dataset challenges, including the AI4D African Lan-  
507 guage Dataset Challenge, similarly mobilize distributed partici-  
508 pation to surface and improve underrepresented language  
509 data [44]. Finally, regional research networks (e.g., EthioNLP)  
510 support sustained scholarly visibility for Ethiopian languages,  
511 where linguistic diversity is substantial and the resource gap  
512 remains acute [45]. These ecosystem layers matter because  
513 they shift the “linguistic policy” of what counts as legitimate  
514 research output, who is recognized as an expert, and which lan-  
515 guage varieties receive iterative investment.

516 **Indigenous languages in Latin America and the Amer-**  
517 **icas.** There are on-going community efforts in Latin Amer-  
518 ica foreground the same structural problem: linguistic “low-  
519 resource” status is historically produced and institutionally re-  
520 inforced. The *AmericasNLP* workshop series has helped orga-  
521 nize shared tasks and benchmarks for Indigenous languages of  
522 the Americas, often in translation settings where Spanish acts  
523 as a high-resource pivot language [46]. Recent survey work  
524 also documents uneven NLP progress across Indigenous Latin  
525 American languages, emphasizing that the limiting factor is  
526 not only data volume but also institutional support, evaluation  
527 norms, and long-term stewardship practices [47]. This compar-  
528 ative lens reinforces our argument that cultural competence can-  
529 not be solved by a single multilingual model; it requires shifting  
530 the socio-technical conditions under which language varieties  
531 become visible, supported, and governable.

532 **Afro-diaspora English varieties as a “within-English”**  
533 **resource divide.** A useful comparative lens comes from  
534 Afro-diaspora English varieties across the Americas and the  
535 Caribbean, where colonial English has been taken up, trans-  
536 formed, and sustained through ethno-linguistic community  
537 practice—including African American English (AAE)[48], Ja-  
538 maican Patwa and Caribbean Creole [49, 50], Barbadian En-  
539 glish, and Belizean English [17]. Although English is typically  
540 treated as a “Winner” language in NLP resource taxonomies,  
541 these varieties often remain underrepresented in training data,  
542 evaluation sets, and product-facing speech interfaces that im-  
543 plicitly privilege standardized prestige norms. As a result,  
544 speakers can experience a familiar pattern of exclusion [3]: *mis-*  
545 *recognition* (accent/dialect-specific error), *misalignment* (prag-  
546 matic and semantic misunderstanding of culturally situated ex-  
547 pressions), and *mistrust* (disengagement after repeated failures).  
548 This illustrates a broader point central to our argument: cultural

competence cannot be inferred from language-level coverage 549  
alone. Even when a language appears “well-resourced,” colo- 550  
nial linguistic ideology can reproduce scarcity and marginal- 551  
ization at the level of dialect, creole, and community variation 552  
[51]. 553

554 These initiatives share several features that distinguish them  
555 from conventional “inclusion” efforts: they are community-  
556 led rather than corporate-led; they prioritize community gov-  
557 ernance over data extraction; they define research agendas from  
558 local needs rather than external benchmarks; and they treat  
559 speakers as experts on their own languages rather than as data  
560 sources. The framework we propose in the next section formal-  
561 izes these principles into a replicable design methodology.

## 562 7. A Participatory Framework for 563 Culturally Competent Speech AI

564 Building on the theoretical analysis in Sections 2–3, the harm  
565 taxonomy in Section 4, and the community-led models in Sec-  
566 tion 5, we propose a participatory framework for designing  
567 and evaluating culturally competent speech AI. The framework  
568 comprises four interconnected pillars, each addressing a differ-  
569 ent phase of the speech AI lifecycle.

570 Recent work in culturally competent and culture-sensitive  
571 AI emphasizes that failures often arise not from isolated tech-  
572 nical errors, but from *cultural incongruencies*: mismatches be-  
573 tween a system’s implicit cultural assumptions and the situated  
574 norms, values, and communicative practices of the communities  
575 it serves [29]. Complementing this, culture-sensitive and par-  
576 ticipatory approaches in public-sector AI stress that responsive-  
577 ness requires more than representational inclusion; it requires  
578 iterative engagement with stakeholders, contextual accountabil-  
579 ity, and mechanisms for adjustment when harms surface in prac-  
580 tice [52].

581 Our framework differs from these prior approaches in two  
582 key ways. First, rather than treating cultural competence as a  
583 high-level design aspiration or domain-specific requirement, we  
584 *operationalize* it through the 3M taxonomy as a concrete, re-  
585 curring audit criterion: systems must be assessed not only for  
586 misrecognition, but also for misalignment (culturally situated  
587 meaning failures) and mistrust (relational and legitimacy fail-  
588 ures). Second, we model the speech AI lifecycle as a *loop of*  
589 *repair and redress* rather than a one-time alignment exercise:  
590 participatory auditing informs community co-design choices,  
591 which shapes equitable deployment constraints, which then  
592 generates feedback signals that trigger further auditing and re-  
593 mediation. This loop makes cultural competence measurable,  
594 revisable, and governable over time, particularly in contexts  
595 where colonial linguistic hierarchies have historically shaped  
596 what speech is treated as “standard,” “supported,” and “intelli-  
597 gible.” In speech settings, these incongruencies can surface even  
598 when transcription appears correct, because pragmatic meaning  
599 (e.g., honorifics, indirectness, idioms, code-switching) is cultur-  
600 ally indexed and easily normalized away by dominant-language  
601 priors.

602 Figure 2 depicts the framework as a loop rather than a  
603 pipeline, emphasizing that cultural competence requires contin-  
604 uous repair. The 3M taxonomy functions as the auditing instru-  
605 ment that links evaluation to redesign and redress.

606 Participation is not inherently emancipatory. Without ex-  
607 plicit safeguards, participatory processes can produce represen-  
608 tational capture (where a narrow set of voices stands in for  
609 the whole), community-washing (symbolic involvement with-




Figure 2: A participatory framework for culturally competent speech AI. The four pillars form a continuous loop; participatory auditing uses the 3M taxonomy to surface misrecognition, misalignment, and mistrust and to guide repair.

610 out authority), and extractive data collection that does not include withdrawal rights or benefit-sharing governance [40]. The framework therefore treats participation as a governance commitment rather than a methodological add-on.

### 614 7.1. Pillar 1: Participatory Auditing

615 Participatory auditing shifts evaluation authority from system developers to the communities whose voices the system is intended to serve. Rather than relying solely on benchmark datasets and quantitative metrics, participatory auditing involves community members in identifying, characterizing, and prioritizing system failures.

621 Concretely, participatory auditing proceeds as follows. First, community members—not external annotators—generate culturally situated test utterances that reflect real-world speech contexts, including code-switching, idiomatic expressions, honorifics, and domain-specific vocabulary (e.g., healthcare terminology in local languages). Second, community members evaluate system outputs against all three dimensions of the 3M taxonomy: transcription accuracy (Misrecognition), meaning fidelity (Misalignment), and subjective trust (Mistrust). Third, communities prioritize which failures are most consequential *in their context*, a distinction that external evaluators cannot make without situated knowledge.

633 This approach builds on the design justice principle that those most affected by a system’s outcomes should have the greatest say in its evaluation [53], and addresses critiques that participatory methods must go beyond tokenistic inclusion to redistribute evaluative authority [40, 54].

### 638 7.2. Pillar 2: Community Co-Design

639 Community co-design involves language communities in shaping the data collection, annotation, and model development processes, not as consultants after the fact, but as partners from the outset. Drawing on Harrington et al.’s deconstructed community-based design methodology [55], co-design in this framework requires three commitments: (1) language communities define what counts as “accurate” and “appropriate” system behavior for their contexts; (2) annotation guidelines are developed collaboratively, reflecting local linguistic norms rather than external standards; (3) communities retain governance rights over the speech data they contribute, including the right to withdraw data and to shape how it is used.

651 The co-design process also attends to what we call *productive non-recognition*: cases in which communities may prefer that a system *not* recognize or record certain speech, for reasons of cultural protocol, privacy, or resistance to surveillance. This is a dimension of cultural competence that inclusion-focused frameworks typically overlook: true competence includes knowing when not to listen.

### 658 7.3. Pillar 3: Equitable Deployment

659 Equitable deployment addresses the governance of speech AI systems once they are built. It asks: who controls the system? Who benefits from its deployment? Who bears the costs of its failures? This pillar draws on Sambasivan et al.’s analysis of how fairness must be re-imagined across cultural contexts [56] and Mohamed et al.’s de-colonial AI framework [12].

665 Equitable deployment requires that communities have a role in deciding (a) whether a speech AI system is deployed in their context at all, (b) under what conditions it operates, (c) how failures are reported and remediated, and (d) how benefits (e.g. economic benefits from data and model improvements), are distributed. This is not a technical requirement but a governance one, and it necessarily involves institutional, legal, and political mechanisms beyond the scope of system design alone.

### 673 7.4. Pillar 4: Feedback Integration

674 Feedback integration closes the loop between deployment and development. It ensures that community-identified failures, cultural misalignments, and trust deficits are systematically channeled back into the system improvement process. Concretely, this involves mechanisms for users to (a) flag when a system has misrecognized their speech, (b) provide corrected transcriptions in their own terms, (c) indicate when the system has misunderstood meaning or intent, and (d) report when they feel the system was not designed for them.

683 These four pillars are interdependent: participatory auditing generates the situated knowledge that informs co-design; co-design produces systems that are more amenable to equitable deployment; equitable deployment creates the institutional conditions for sustained feedback integration; and feedback integration improves the system in ways that participatory auditing can verify.

## 690 8. Discussion and Future Work

691 This paper offers a theoretical and conceptual contribution; it does not present experimental results or empirical data from new studies. This is a deliberate choice. The speech AI community’s understandable emphasis on empirical benchmarking can obscure the need for the kind of foundational rethinking we propose here: before we can measure cultural competence, we must articulate what it means; before we can audit for harm, we must develop a taxonomy of harms that extends beyond transcription accuracy; before we can design participatory systems, we must theorize participation in ways that attend to colonial histories and power asymmetries.

702 That said, the framework we propose is designed for empirical operationalization. We envision three lines of future work. First, a **cross-linguistic bias audit** applying the 3M taxonomy to evaluate commercial and open-source ASR systems across 3–5 Global South language communities, producing both quantitative disparity measurements and qualitative harm assessments. Second, a **participatory co-design study** in partnership with community organizations in West Africa, East Africa,

710 and/or South Asia, testing the framework’s four pillars in prac-  
711 tice and generating empirically grounded design requirements  
712 for culturally competent speech AI. Third, a **systematic lingu-  
713 stic policy analysis** mapping the implicit and explicit language  
714 policies of major speech AI platforms against colonial language  
715 hierarchies, producing actionable policy recommendations for  
716 developers and regulators.

717 We acknowledge several limitations. Our framework is inten-  
718 tionally broad; its application to specific language commu-  
719 nities will require contextual adaptation. The four-pillar struc-  
720 ture simplifies what are, in practice, deeply entangled processes.  
721 And participatory methods, as Sloane et al. remind us, are not  
722 inherently emancipatory: they must be designed with care to  
723 avoid reproducing the power asymmetries they aim to address  
724 [40].

725 We also argue for *non-recognition* as a legitimate design  
726 outcome. In some contexts, opacity-by-design and selective lis-  
727 tening are necessary for privacy, safety, and cultural protocol.  
728 Communities should be able to determine when systems listen,  
729 what gets stored, and when speech is intentionally *not* recog-  
730 nized or retained, especially in settings where surveillance is a  
731 credible risk [32].

732 **Refusal and selective intelligibility as design practice.**  
733 Our emphasis on non-recognition is not a retreat from inclu-  
734 sion, but an argument for *selective intelligibility*: communities  
735 should be able to determine when, how, and for what purposes  
736 their voices become machine-readable. This aligns with long-  
737 standing work in privacy and resistance that treats *obfuscation*  
738 and intentional friction as legitimate responses to extractive data  
739 regimes [57]. It also resonates with critiques of classification  
740 systems that produce harm precisely by forcing people into leg-  
741 ible categories (e.g., automatic gender recognition), where re-  
742 fusal can be both protective and politically clarifying [58]. In  
743 this spirit, we position refusal not merely as a post-hoc user  
744 option, but as a *designable governance commitment*, a set of  
745 defaults, interfaces, and institutional guardrails that restrict cap-  
746 ture, limit downstream reuse, and preserve the right to opacity  
747 when recognition would amplify risk or reproduce colonial lin-  
748 guistic hierarchies [59].

749 If speech AI is to fulfill its promise of bringing people  
750 and communities closer across languages and cultures, it must  
751 reckon with the colonial legacies that have historically deter-  
752 mined who gets to speak, who gets understood, and who gets to  
753 build the systems that listen.

## 754 References

- 755 [1] A. Radford, J. W. Kim, T. Xu, G. Brockman,  
756 C. McLeavey, and I. Sutskever, “Robust Speech Recog-  
757 nition via Large-Scale Weak Supervision,” in *Proc. Inter-  
758 national Conference on Machine Learning (ICML)*, 2023,  
759 pp. 28 492–28 518.
- 760 [2] A. Conneau, A. Baevski, R. Collobert, A. Mohamed,  
761 and M. Auli, “Unsupervised Cross-Lingual Representa-  
762 tion Learning for Speech Recognition,” in *Proc. Annual  
763 Conference of the International Speech Communication  
764 Association (INTERSPEECH)*, 2021, pp. 2426–2430.
- 765 [3] A. Koenecke, A. Nam, E. Lake, J. Nudell, M. Quartey,  
766 Z. Mengesha, C. Tober, H. R. Reeves, J. R. Grieco, E. R.  
767 Cerf, G. R. Brammer, and S. Goel, “Racial Disparities in  
768 Automated Speech Recognition,” *Proceedings of the Na-  
769 tional Academy of Sciences*, vol. 117, no. 14, pp. 7684–  
770 7689, 2020.
- [4] P. Joshi, S. Santy, A. Budhiraja, K. Bali, and M. Choud- 771  
hury, “The State and Fate of Linguistic Diversity and In- 772  
clusion in the NLP World,” in *Proc. Annual Meeting of the 773  
Association for Computational Linguistics (ACL)*, 2020, 774  
pp. 6282–6293. 775
- [5] R. Phillipson, *Linguistic Imperialism*. Oxford: Oxford 776  
University Press, 1992. 777
- [6] N. ugī wa Thiong’o, *Decolonising the Mind: The Politics 778  
of Language in African Literature*. London: James Cur- 779  
rey, 1986. 780
- [7] P. Bourdieu, *Language and Symbolic Power*. Cambridge, 781  
MA: Harvard University Press, 1991. 782
- [8] J. Rosa and N. Flores, “Unsettling Race and Language: 783  
Toward a Raciolinguistic Perspective,” *Language in Soci- 784  
ety*, vol. 46, no. 5, pp. 621–647, 2017. 785
- [9] N. Flores and J. Rosa, “Undoing Appropriateness: Raci- 786  
olinguistic Ideologies and Language Diversity in Educa- 787  
tion,” *Harvard Educational Review*, vol. 85, no. 2, pp. 788  
149–171, 2015. 789
- [10] S. M. Ali, “A Brief Introduction to Decolonial Comput- 790  
ing,” *XRDS: Crossroads, The ACM Magazine for Stu- 791  
dents*, vol. 22, no. 4, pp. 16–21, 2016. 792
- [11] L. Irani, J. Vertesi, P. Dourish, K. Philip, and R. E. Grinter, 793  
“Postcolonial Computing: A Lens on Design and Develop- 794  
ment,” in *Proc. ACM Conference on Human Factors in 795  
Computing Systems (CHI)*, 2010, pp. 1311–1320. 796
- [12] S. Mohamed, M.-T. Png, and W. Isaac, “Decolonial AI: 797  
Decolonial Theory as Sociotechnical Foresight in Arti- 798  
ficial Intelligence,” *Philosophy & Technology*, vol. 33, 799  
no. 4, pp. 659–684, 2020. 800
- [13] D. Paffey, *Language Ideologies and the Globalization of 801  
“Standard” Spanish*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 802  
2012. 803
- [14] A. Soares da Silva, “Pluricentricity and variation in the 804  
portuguese language,” in *Pluricentric Languages in the 805  
Americas*, R. Muhr and A. Soares da Silva, Eds. Berlin: 806  
Peter Lang, 2022. 807
- [15] S. Bird, “Decolonising Speech and Language Technol- 808  
ogy,” in *Proc. International Conference on Computational 809  
Linguistics (COLING)*, 2020, pp. 3504–3519. 810
- [16] P. Joshi, S. Santy, A. Budhiraja, K. Bali, and M. Choud- 811  
hury, “The state and fate of linguistic diversity and inclu- 812  
sion in the NLP world,” in *Proceedings of the 58th Annual 813  
Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguis- 814  
tics*. Association for Computational Linguistics, 2020, 815  
pp. 6282–6293. 816
- [17] R. Lippi-Green, *English with an Accent: Language, Ide- 817  
ology, and Discrimination in the United States*, 2nd ed. 818  
London: Routledge, 2012. 819
- [18] P. Dourish and S. D. Mainwaring, “UbiComp’s Colonial 820  
Impulse,” in *Proc. ACM Conference on Ubiquitous Com- 821  
puting (UbiComp)*, 2012, pp. 133–142. 822
- [19] F. Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*. New York: Grove 823  
Press, 1952. 824
- [20] D. E. Blasi, A. Anastasopoulos, and G. Neubig, “System- 825  
atic Inequalities in Language Technology Performance 826  
across the World’s Languages,” in *Proc. Annual Meeting 827  
of the Association for Computational Linguistics (ACL)*, 828  
2022, pp. 5486–5505. 829

- 830 [21] N. Couldry and U. A. Mejias, “Data Colonialism: Re-  
831 thinking Big Data’s Relation to the Contemporary Sub-  
832 ject,” *Television & New Media*, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 336–  
833 349, 2019.
- 834 [22] D. Haraway, “Situated knowledges: The science question  
835 in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective,” in  
836 *Women, Science, and Technology*. Routledge, 2013, pp.  
837 455–472.
- 838 [23] L. Suchman, “Located accountabilities in technology pro-  
839 duction,” *Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems*,  
840 vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 7–19, 2002.
- 841 [24] N. Markl, “Language Variation and Algorithmic Bias:  
842 Understanding Algorithmic Unfairness and the Role of  
843 Language,” in *Proc. ACM Conference on Fairness, Ac-  
844 countability, and Transparency (FAccT)*, 2022.
- 845 [25] A. B. Wassink *et al.*, “Uneven Success: Automatic Speech  
846 Recognition and Ethnicity-Related Dialects,” *Speech  
847 Communication*, vol. 140, pp. 50–70, 2022.
- 848 [26] S. L. Blodgett, Q. V. Liao, A. Olteanu, R. Mihalcea,  
849 M. Muller, M. K. Scheuerman, C. Tan, and Q. Yang,  
850 “Responsible language technologies: Foreseeing and mit-  
851 igating harms,” in *CHI Conference on Human Factors in  
852 Computing Systems Extended Abstracts*, 2022, pp. 1–3.
- 853 [27] S. L. Blodgett, S. Barocas, H. Daume, and H. Wallach,  
854 “Language (technology) is power: A critical survey of  
855 “bias” in nlp,” in *Proceedings of the 58th Annual Meeting  
856 of the Association for Computational Linguistics*, 2020.
- 857 [28] J. L. Martin and K. Tang, “Bias in Automatic Speech  
858 Recognition: The Case of African American Language,”  
859 *WIREs Computational Statistics*, vol. 16, no. 2, p. e1650,  
860 2024.
- 861 [29] V. Prabhakaran, R. Qadri, and B. Hutchinson, “Cultural  
862 incongruencies in artificial intelligence,” *arXiv preprint  
863 arXiv:2211.13069*, 2022.
- 864 [30] A. DiChristofano, H. Shuster, S. Chandra, and N. Patwari,  
865 “Global Voices, Local Biases: Socioeconomic Disparities  
866 in Speech Recognition across Languages,” *arXiv preprint  
867 arXiv:2305.11080*, 2024.
- 868 [31] Z. Mengesha, C. Heldreth, M. Lahav, J. Sublewski, and  
869 E. Tuennerman, ““I Don’t Think These Devices Are Very  
870 Intelligent” – Examining Perceptions of Voice Assistants  
871 among Speakers of Stigmatized Dialects of English,” in  
872 *Proc. ACM Conference on Human Factors in Computing  
873 Systems (CHI)*, 2021, pp. 1–13.
- 874 [32] S. Browne, *Dark matters: On the surveillance of black-  
875 ness*. Duke University Press, 2015.
- 876 [33] W. Nekoto, V. Marivate, T. Matsila, T. Fasubaa, T. Fagbo-  
877 hungbe, S. O. Akinola, S. H. Muhammad, S. K. Kabena-  
878 mualu, S. Osei, F. Sackey *et al.*, “Participatory Research  
879 for Low-Resourced Machine Translation: A Case Study  
880 in African Languages,” in *Findings of the Association  
881 for Computational Linguistics: EMNLP 2020*, 2020, pp.  
882 2144–2160.
- 883 [34] I. Wiafe, J.-D. Abdulai, A. O. Ekpezu, R. D. Helegah,  
884 E. D. Atsakpo, C. Nutroktor, F. B. P. Winful, and K. K.  
885 Solaga, “Advancing automatic speech recognition for low-  
886 resource ghanaiian languages: Audio datasets for akan,  
887 ewe, dagbani, dagaare, and ikposo,” *Data in Brief*, vol. 61,  
888 p. 111880, 2025.
- [35] “Khaya: African language translation & speech (app /  
documentation),” <https://translate.ghananlp.org/>, accessed 2026-02-21.
- [36] “Ghananlp,” <https://ghananlp.github.io/>, accessed 2026-02-21.
- [37] “Ghananlp: Ghanaian nlp datasets & models (repository),” <https://github.com/GhanaNLP/ghanaiian-nlp-datasets-models>, accessed 2026-02-21.
- [38] D. Kakwani, A. Kunchukuttan, S. Golla, G. N.C., A. Bhat-  
tacharyya, M. M. Khapra, and P. Kumar, “IndicNLPsuite:  
Monolingual Corpora, Evaluation Benchmarks and Pre-  
trained Multilingual Language Models for Indian Lan-  
guages,” in *Findings of the Association for Computational  
Linguistics: EMNLP 2020*, 2020, pp. 4948–4961.
- [39] R. Ardila, M. Branson, K. Davis, M. Kohler, J. Meyer,  
M. Henretty, R. Morais, L. Saunders, F. M. Tyers, and  
G. Weber, “Common Voice: A Massively-Multilingual  
Speech Corpus,” in *Proc. Language Resources and Eval-  
uation Conference (LREC)*, 2020, pp. 4218–4222.
- [40] M. Sloane, E. Moss, O. Awomolo, and L. Forlano, “Par-  
ticipation Is Not a Design Fix for Machine Learning,” in  
*Proc. Equity and Access in Algorithms, Mechanisms, and  
Optimization (EAAMO)*, 2022, pp. 1–6.
- [41] “Africanlp 2020: Unlocking local languages (workshop  
cfp),” <https://easychair.org/cfp/africanlp2020workshop>,  
accessed 2026-02-21.
- [42] “Niger-volta language technologies institute (organiza-  
tion),” <https://github.com/niger-volta-lti>, accessed 2026-02-21.
- [43] “Niger-volta-lti: Yorùbá voice dataset (repository),”  
<https://github.com/Niger-Volta-LTI/yoruba-voice>, ac-  
cessed 2026-02-21.
- [44] “Ai4d african language dataset chal-  
lenge,” [https://zindi.africa/competitions/  
ai4d-african-language-dataset-challenge](https://zindi.africa/competitions/ai4d-african-language-dataset-challenge), accessed  
2026-02-21.
- [45] “Ethionlp: Ethiopian natural language processing re-  
search community,” <https://ethionlp.github.io/>, accessed  
2026-02-21.
- [46] “Americasnlp: Workshop on nlp for indigenous lan-  
guages of the americas,” [https://turing.iimas.unam.mx/  
americasnlp/](https://turing.iimas.unam.mx/americasnlp/), accessed 2026-02-21.
- [47] “Nlp progress in indigenous latin american languages,”  
*arXiv*, 2024, <https://arxiv.org/abs/2404.05365>.
- [48] J. R. Rickford, *African American Vernacular English: Features, Evolution, Educational Implications*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1999.
- [49] P. L. Patrick, *Urban Jamaican Creole: Variation in the Mesolect*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1999.
- [50] J. A. Holm, *Pidgins and Creoles, Volume 1: Theory and Structure*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- [51] R. Lippi-Green, *English with an Accent: Language, Ideology, and Discrimination in the United States*, 2nd ed. New York, NY: Routledge, 2012.
- [52] P. Ahrweiler, “Towards culture-sensitive, responsive, and participatory ai,” in *Participatory Artificial Intelligence in Public Social Services: From Bias to Fairness in Assessing Beneficiaries*. Springer, 2025, pp. 277–306.

- 948 [53] S. Costanza-Chock, *Design Justice: Community-Led*  
949 *Practices to Build the Worlds We Need*. Cambridge, MA:  
950 MIT Press, 2020.
- 951 [54] A. Birhane, W. Isaac, V. Prabhakaran, M. Díaz, M. C.  
952 Elish, I. Gabriel, and S. Mohamed, “Power to the Peo-  
953 ple? Opportunities and Challenges for Participatory AI,”  
954 in *Proc. Equity and Access in Algorithms, Mechanisms,*  
955 *and Optimization (EAAMO)*, 2022, pp. 1–6.
- 956 [55] C. Harrington, S. Erete, and A. M. Piper, “Deconstruct-  
957 ing Community-Based Collaborative Design: Towards  
958 More Equitable Participatory Design Engagements,” in  
959 *Proc. ACM Conference on Computer-Supported Coopera-*  
960 *tive Work and Social Computing (CSCW)*, 2019, pp. 1–25.
- 961 [56] N. Sambasivan, E. Arnesen, B. Hutchinson, T. Doshi, and  
962 V. Prabhakaran, “Re-imagining Algorithmic Fairness in  
963 India and Beyond,” in *Proc. ACM Conference on Fair-*  
964 *ness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT)*, 2021,  
965 pp. 315–328.
- 966 [57] F. Brunton and H. Nissenbaum, *Obfuscation: A User’s*  
967 *Guide for Privacy and Protest*. MIT Press, 2015.
- 968 [58] O. Keyes, “The misgendering machines: Trans/hci im-  
969 plications of automatic gender recognition,” *Proceedings*  
970 *of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction*, vol. 2, no.  
971 CSCW, pp. 1–22, 2018.
- 972 [59] J. Cunningham, G. Benabdallah, D. Rosner, and A. Taylor,  
973 “On the grounds of solutionism: Ontologies of blackness  
974 and hci,” *ACM Transactions on Computer-Human Inter-*  
975 *action*, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 1–17, 2023.