WHITE PAPER

The Phase 2 Manufacturing Wall™

Why Manufacturing Unreadiness Becomes Enterprise Risk

A Framework for Executive Teams and CMC Leaders

HIDDEN FRAGILITY BECOMES ENTERPRISE RISK UNDER SCALE

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Executive Overview

The Problem

Manufacturing fragility often remains invisible while enterprise exposure accelerates.

The Framework

The Phase 2 Manufacturing Wall™ explains how this divergence develops.

The Consequence

Programs collide with manufacturing reality after the organization has already scaled around assumptions of readiness.

The Opportunity

Earlier visibility creates a meaningful intervention window.

Framework Origin

The Phase 2 Manufacturing Wall™ framework was originally developed by Lonnie Robarge, Ph.D. This publication was developed collaboratively by Lonnie Robarge, Ph.D. and Bharat Gurale, Ph.D. to further develop and communicate the framework.

Executive Summary

The Phase 2 Manufacturing Wall™ is the point at which hidden manufacturing fragility becomes visible enterprise risk.

Biotech programs are financed, valued, and operationally managed around visible clinical progress. Yet many of the operational disruptions that emerge approaching and beyond Phase 2 are not driven by biology alone. They arise from manufacturing systems that appeared stable during early development but were never fully prepared for the scale, variability, and operational complexity that followed.

Programs that advance successfully through toxicology and Phase 1 often encounter a familiar pattern later in development:

- widening impurity variability
- transfer instability
- validation setbacks
- recurring investigations
- process sensitivity under scale
- operational fragility across distributed execution

In our experience these events are rarely random. More often, they reflect a widening divergence between the growth of the enterprise and the depth of manufacturing understanding supporting it — a divergence that develops quietly during early development.

Early-stage manufacturing environments naturally suppress variability through limited scale, concentrated technical oversight, constrained operating conditions, and simplified execution. Under these conditions, repeated batch success is often interpreted as evidence of readiness rather than evidence of performance within a narrow operating environment.

At the same time, enterprise exposure accelerates on every front. Teams and burn rates grow, external manufacturing networks expand, and timelines compress, while investor expectations and commercial dependency build around a process whose understanding has not advanced at the same pace.

Manufacturing understanding, however, often matures much more gradually. For a period of time, this mismatch remains largely invisible. As programs advance, however, increasing scale, operational complexity, and distributed execution begin exposing the limits of existing manufacturing understanding.

We refer to this inflection point as the Phase 2 Manufacturing Wall.

The Phase 2 Manufacturing Wall framework serves as the foundation for a broader body of work examining how operational fragility evolves into enterprise risk. This paper introduces the Wall and the mechanisms that create it. Future publications will examine the financial consequences of manufacturing unreadiness, the governance dynamics that distort interpretation, and the role of organizational momentum in amplifying the consequences of manufacturing unreadiness.



The Phase 2 Manufacturing Wall

The Wall is not the point at which manufacturing risk is created. It is the point at which accumulated uncertainty becomes operationally impossible to ignore. The central premise of this paper is straightforward:

The Wall is not where manufacturing risk begins. It is where the enterprise finally becomes too large to absorb it.

Organizations that recognize manufacturing fragility earlier gain the opportunity not to eliminate uncertainty, but to prevent uncertainty from compounding invisibly until it becomes operationally and financially destabilizing.

Introduction

In our observation, organizations rarely collide with the Wall because they ignore manufacturing. They collide with it because development systems often reward visible progress more effectively than they reveal operational fragility.

The most consequential manufacturing risks in drug development are rarely created at the moment they become visible. More often, they accumulate gradually while programs continue to generate positive clinical, financial, and organizational signals. As confidence grows, enterprise exposure frequently expands faster than manufacturing understanding. The result is a widening gap between perceived readiness and actual readiness that may remain largely hidden until development reaches a point where corrective action becomes substantially more difficult, expensive, and disruptive.

In many cases confidence is justified. At the same time, it can create a dangerous interpretation: that successful early execution is evidence of manufacturing readiness at scale.

Across the industry, many of the operational disruptions that emerge approaching and beyond Phase 2 are not sudden failures of chemistry, biology, or manufacturing competence. More often, they represent the delayed exposure of limitations that already existed within the development system:

- incomplete process characterization
- partially understood impurity pathways
- analytical methods designed to confirm product acceptability rather than explain process behavior
- fragmented process knowledge
- manufacturing strategies designed for near-term execution rather than long-term robustness

The challenge is fundamentally structural.

Many of the uncertainties that ultimately challenge manufacturing scale-up are not absent during early development. They remain operationally manageable within a constrained environment. As a result, organizations can continue advancing successfully while important limitations in process understanding, control, and robustness remain only partially characterized.

Most development systems are not designed to integrate these weak signals into a coherent picture of enterprise exposure until late in development. As development progresses, increasing scale, complexity, and distributed execution begin exposing the limits of existing manufacturing understanding. This is the point at which manufacturing fragility becomes visible.

A note on how to read what follows. This framework makes three kinds of claims, kept distinct throughout: documented industry mechanisms, supported by the cases in Appendix A; patterns we have observed directly across development programs, offered as practitioner experience rather than statistical evidence; and structuring models — including the Readiness–Exposure Gap™ and the figures — offered as lenses for judgment, not measurement. Figures that illustrate a relationship rather than plot data are labeled as such.

1. The Illusion of Readiness

Early success often increases confidence faster than manufacturing understanding. The resulting gap can remain hidden until scale begins exposing its limits.

Early development success creates a powerful organizational signal: **the process works.**

Material is produced under controlled conditions, impurity profiles remain acceptable, and early clinical milestones are achieved without visible manufacturing disruption.

Over time, successful execution reinforces a broader perception that the manufacturing system is becoming increasingly reliable. This perception forms the foundation of what we refer to as the Illusion of Readiness.

The illusion does not emerge because organizations ignore manufacturing risk. More often, it develops because successful execution under early-stage conditions is gradually interpreted as evidence of manufacturing robustness at scale.

In practice, these are fundamentally different questions. A process can perform consistently within a narrow operating window while remaining poorly characterized outside of it.

Early development environments naturally suppress variability through tightly controlled execution, concentrated oversight, and limited operational complexity.

Conceptual illustration. The divergence between observed performance and actual understanding is the point; the levels shown are not measured.



The Illusion of Readiness

Under these conditions, stability may appear established long before the boundaries of process behavior are fully understood.

At the same time, clinical advancement reinforces organizational confidence. Material continues arriving on schedule, financing events occur, teams expand, and expectations for future scale rise alongside program momentum.

Repeated execution gradually becomes conflated with readiness.

What has often been demonstrated, however, is feasibility under constrained conditions rather than robustness under changing ones.

Over time, observed success and actual understanding do not necessarily advance at the same rate. Clinical progress, successful batch execution, financing events, and organizational growth can create an increasing perception of readiness even while critical aspects of process behavior remain only partially understood. The resulting gap is rarely visible during early development because operating conditions remain constrained. It often becomes apparent only when increasing scale, complexity, and distributed execution begin exposing the limits of current understanding.

The figure above illustrates this divergence. As programs advance, perceived readiness often grows faster than actual process understanding. The difference between the two forms the foundation of the Illusion of Readiness and helps explain why manufacturing fragility can remain hidden until programs approach the Wall.

In our observation, the gap between observed performance and actual understanding is not accidental. It is a predictable consequence of how biotech development systems prioritize work during early stages.

Programs are rewarded for speed, milestone achievement, capital efficiency, and rapid clinical advancement, while the work required to deeply characterize manufacturing behavior is frequently deferred because it does not yet appear critical to the next visible milestone.

As a result, manufacturing fragility accumulates gradually beneath the surface of apparent progress.

By the time programs approach and move beyond Phase 2, scale, operational complexity, distributed execution, and enterprise exposure begin revealing the gap simultaneously.

What appears externally as a sudden manufacturing failure is often the delayed operational exposure of uncertainty accumulated much earlier in development.

2. Why Organizations Miss the Wall

The Wall persists not because organizations lack expertise, but because development systems are designed to amplify visible progress while obscuring manufacturing fragility.

Development systems are optimized to recognize visible progress, not invisible uncertainty. Clinical milestones, financing events, and organizational growth create strong signals that programs are advancing successfully, while manufacturing understanding typically deepens much more gradually. This structural asymmetry allows enterprise confidence to increase even as manufacturing fragility remains only partially understood. Most development systems are organized around visible progress:

- advancing clinical milestones
- achieving financing objectives
- maintaining operational momentum
- preserving capital efficiency
- accelerating toward value-inflection events

However, manufacturing readiness evolves differently.

It advances incrementally through process characterization, impurity understanding, analytical refinement, transfer preparation, and the gradual reduction of uncertainty surrounding how the system behaves under increasingly complex conditions.

This creates a structural asymmetry within the development system itself. Clinical progress is immediately visible to organizations, investors, and boards. Manufacturing fragility is not.

Instead, manufacturing fragility typically appears through fragmented operational signals that rarely convey their significance when viewed independently.

One signal is board-visible. The other remains operationally fragmented.

Organizations can therefore experience increasing confidence at the executive level while simultaneously accumulating increasing fragility at the operational level without fully recognizing the divergence between them.

This imbalance is reinforced by development incentives that reward visible progress long before the benefits of deeper manufacturing understanding become apparent. The activities that deepen manufacturing understanding often compete directly against these pressures.

The issue is rarely that these activities are considered unimportant.

The challenge is timing. The benefits of deeper manufacturing characterization are often deferred during the same period when organizations are most heavily incentivized to accelerate visible progress.

As a result, portions of manufacturing understanding continue to be deferred until increasing complexity forces them back onto the critical path. By that stage, the enterprise surrounding the process has often scaled substantially.

Manufacturing fragility therefore becomes organizationally visible only after enterprise exposure has already accelerated around the program.



Fragmented Interpretation of Manufacturing Risk

This is not normalization of deviance or escalation of commitment; both describe organizations responding to risk they can already see, whereas the Phase 2 Manufacturing Wall's earliest and most dangerous phase is risk that hasn't become visible at all. It also differs from a Manufacturing Readiness Level (MRL) assessment, which scores process maturity on an absolute scale. A maturity score says where the process stands; the Wall measures what MRL does not — whether exposure is outpacing readiness, and whether anyone sees the gap before it becomes the Wall.

Before organizations can align around a response, they must first align around the problem itself.

Organizations rarely experience manufacturing

Instead, the same underlying operational instability is often observed through multiple organizational lenses simultaneously.

Manufacturing teams may see process variability. Clinical teams may attribute emerging issues to patient complexity. Finance may interpret delays as execution problems. Leadership may view setbacks as temporary friction within an otherwise successful strategy. Investors and boards often receive only partial visibility into the underlying causes.

Each interpretation may appear reasonable when viewed independently.

The challenge is that no single function possesses a complete picture of the system. As a result, organizations can begin constructing different explanations for the same underlying reality. What starts as a manufacturing understanding gap gradually becomes an organizational understanding gap.

The figure above illustrates this phenomenon. A single unstable operational reality is refracted through multiple organizational perspectives, creating competing interpretations of the same underlying condition. Before the organization can align around an effective response, its shared understanding of the problem has already begun to fragment.

3. The Readiness–Exposure Gap™

Manufacturing failures that emerge in Phase 2 are often rooted in decisions made much earlier, when uncertainty was acceptable and enterprise exposure was still small.

By the time programs approach and move beyond Phase 2, most organizations have accumulated substantial operational data.

The presence of data, however, is not equivalent to the presence of understanding.

How Risk Gets Embedded Early

The Wall is rarely created at scale. More often, it is revealed there.

The operational disruptions that emerge later in development frequently originate from decisions made much earlier, during periods when timelines were compressed, capital was constrained, and manufacturing systems appeared sufficiently functional for near-term needs.

Across programs we have worked on directly, the same upstream patterns recurred:

- processes optimized around a point rather than characterized across a space
- impurity profiles observed rather than impurity pathways mechanistically understood
- analytical methods designed for release rather than process knowledge
- CDMO selection weighted toward capacity and speed over long-term resilience
- critical process knowledge remaining embedded within individuals rather than institutionalized within the development system

Individually, many of these decisions are rational within the context in which they are made.

The challenge emerges cumulatively. Unresolved manufacturing limitations are carried forward while operational complexity and enterprise dependency continue expanding around the process.

Repeated Execution Is Not Robustness

Repeated execution under fixed conditions demonstrates consistency within a known operating environment. It does not establish how the manufacturing system will behave once conditions begin changing.

As programs advance, however, complexity expands nonlinearly:

- scale increases
- additional unit operations emerge
- supply chains broaden
- external manufacturing networks grow
- cross-site execution expands
- analytical burden increases

Characterization work often progresses more gradually, creating a widening gap between system demands and manufacturing understanding.



Conceptual illustration. The figure shows how exposure can outpace understanding; the trajectories are schematic, not measured.

The Manufacturing Readiness Intervention

Complexity Grows Faster Than Understanding

The same divergence that develops technically also develops at the enterprise level. As programs advance, the consequences attached to manufacturing failure often grow faster than the organization's ability to predict, control, and prevent that failure.

In many cases, the manufacturing system changes little while the enterprise surrounding it expands substantially. More capital, commitments, dependencies, and expectations become attached to the same unresolved uncertainty.

The figure above illustrates this amplification effect.

The resulting Readiness–Exposure Gap emerges when organizational dependency grows faster than manufacturing understanding. The

Wall therefore becomes not simply a manufacturing event, but a collision between unresolved uncertainty and accelerating organizational commitment.

The highest-leverage intervention window often exists before this gap becomes pronounced, when additional investment in manufacturing understanding can materially alter future enterprise risk.

Early in development, unresolved uncertainty carries limited consequences. Later, the same uncertainty exists within a much larger enterprise environment.

Operating Beyond the Depth of Understanding

As the Readiness–Exposure Gap widens, organizations increasingly operate manufacturing systems that remain only partially characterized relative to the complexity they are expected to support.

Programs operating within this gap often appear healthier at the executive level than they do operationally. While milestones continue advancing, manufacturing teams absorb increasing execution burden beneath the surface of apparent progress, widening the disconnect between organizational confidence and operational reality.

4. How the Wall Shows Up

The Wall rarely arrives as a single catastrophic event. More often, it emerges through a growing pattern of instability, complexity, and operational friction.

> *"The Wall is not where the problem begins.*
>
> *It is where the enterprise finally becomes large enough to feel it."*

Organizations rarely experience the Wall as a single failure. Instead, they encounter a succession of seemingly independent operational problems that gradually reveal the limits of manufacturing understanding. What initially appears to be normal development friction often proves to be multiple manifestations of the same underlying fragility.

Scale Reveals Hidden Fragility

Many processes that perform reproducibly during laboratory development become increasingly sensitive as manufacturing scale expands.

Importantly, scale itself is not usually the root cause of the instability.

More often, scale exposes limitations in process understanding that remained partially hidden during early development.

As manufacturing complexity increases, organizations may begin experiencing:

- widening impurity variability as heat and mass transfer behavior diverges at scale
- inconsistent yields
- altered crystallization behavior affecting dissolution and bioavailability
- increasing investigation burden
- widening process sensitivity
- recurring operational intervention

The resulting instability rarely appears immediately catastrophic. More often, organizations experience a gradual increase in operational friction as previously manageable uncertainty becomes increasingly difficult to absorb.

Distributed Execution Exposes Incomplete Understanding

Tech transfer frequently exposes process understanding that was never fully externalized from the original development environment.

During early development, experienced scientists and engineers often compensate for gaps in formal process definition through accumulated familiarity with the system itself.

As execution expands across multiple organizations and sites, manufacturing systems that depend heavily on tacit knowledge become progressively more fragile under distributed operating conditions.

The challenge becomes amplified further as manufacturing systems expand across multiple CDMOs, analytical laboratories, formulation groups, and supply-chain interfaces.

Each additional interface introduces opportunities for divergence:

- differing operational assumptions
- inconsistent analytical interpretation
- fragmented process history
- uneven understanding of critical sensitivities

Programs may therefore experience recurring comparability concerns, prolonged investigations, widening technical disagreement between vendors, or growing dependence on sponsor-side intervention to stabilize execution.

At this stage, organizations often interpret the problem as isolated vendor underperformance.

More often, the issue is structural fragmentation of manufacturing understanding across the network itself.

Complexity Amplifies the Consequences

High-complexity modalities such as ADCs, high-potency compounds, cell and gene therapies, and advanced formulations do not fundamentally change the structure of the Phase 2 Manufacturing Wall.

They intensify it.

These systems operate with narrower margins for unresolved uncertainty from the beginning while simultaneously requiring greater analytical sophistication, broader supply-chain coordination, and more distributed execution.

In these environments, relatively small gaps in process understanding can generate disproportionately large enterprise consequences. Analytical ambiguity, transfer inconsistency, supply-chain fragility, or process variability that might remain operationally manageable in simpler systems can rapidly become development-limiting once timelines compress, manufacturing networks expand, and commercial expectations accelerate around the program.

These modalities are not distinguished merely by technical difficulty. It is that they tolerate far less unresolved uncertainty before operational fragility becomes enterprise-visible.

5. What Should Be Done Differently

Organizations that navigate scale successfully do not eliminate uncertainty. They make uncertainty visible while it is still affordable to address.

The Phase 2 Manufacturing Wall™ is not inevitable because manufacturing uncertainty is not inherently destructive. It becomes destructive when it remains invisible while enterprise exposure continues expanding. Organizations that recognize this distinction shift their objective from eliminating uncertainty to identifying it while intervention remains inexpensive. The objective is not perfect prediction. It is earlier visibility.

Manufacturing readiness should therefore not be viewed as a downstream operational consequence of clinical success.

It should mature deliberately alongside:

- clinical advancement
- financing strategy
- operational scaling
- regulatory planning
- commercial preparation

This requires organizations to ask a fundamentally different question.



The cost to resolve a manufacturing issue increases exponentially the later it is discovered.

Illustrative, not to scale. The shape — escalating cost as exposure compounds — is the point; the per-stage multiplier varies by program, modality, and how late the issue surfaces.

Why Early Visibility Matters

Not:

“Can we make material for the next study?”

But:

“Do we understand this process deeply enough to scale it reliably under increasing operational complexity?”

The issue is not simply technical timing. It is enterprise timing.

A common misconception is that earlier manufacturing investment slows development or increases total program cost. In practice, delayed understanding often creates substantially larger downstream costs once enterprise exposure has accelerated. This reframes the common objection that early process investment is wasted if a molecule fails clinically. Early investment is lost only if the program fails; inadequate process understanding becomes a multiplied cost when successful programs scale. Underfunding process development does not avoid risk — it concentrates it where the consequences are greatest.

Operationalizing Visibility

Recognizing the Wall conceptually is rarely enough on its own. Organizations that act on it tend to convert that recognition into a few recurring, owned practices — not new bureaucracy, but mechanisms that bring manufacturing uncertainty into the same forums where capital, clinical, and timeline decisions are already made. In our experience, five stand out among the organizations we have seen navigate this transition well, in rough order of leverage:

1. A standing register of known unknowns. A maintained list of what the program does not yet understand — parameters not characterized, ranges not challenged, behaviors observed but unexplained — owned by a named technical lead and reviewed at each gate. Items leave it only when resolved with evidence, not because the program advanced past them. An empty register approaching Phase 2 is often a warning, not a reassurance. (Appendix B, Question 1, in operational form.)

2. Readiness reviews tied to exposure events, not the calendar. Anchored to the next financing round, tech transfer, scale change, or site addition — the moments exposure steps up. The review can be narrow: which readiness assumptions the commitment will stress, and which have been tested versus assumed by analogy. The result is a go/no-go decision explicit about what it is betting on.

3. A weak-signal threshold that gives "normal" a defined meaning. Recurring signals — investigations, OOS/OOT trends, yield drift, comparability questions — tend to become dangerous when explained away one at a time. A pre-agreed trigger escalates a signal from the operational level to the readiness review once it recurs beyond a defined frequency, whether or not each instance was independently closed — so "normal" is written down in advance rather than reconstructed afterward.

4. CDMO selection weighted toward resilience. Alongside price and timeline, a balanced framework can weight the factors that shape behavior under untested conditions: the depth of process understanding the partner actually holds, how transferable it is across the network, and how the partner performs when a process misbehaves. A scorecard surfaces this while it is still cheap to act on.

5. A single owner for the readiness–exposure comparison. The framework's central question — whether exposure is outpacing understanding — has no natural home in a functional organization, since no single function sees both rates. Organizations that track it well make someone accountable for placing the two trajectories side by side and reporting the direction of the gap to the forum approving the commitments that widen it. Absent an owner, the comparison becomes everyone's responsibility and therefore no one's.

These practices are deliberately lightweight; their main expense is attention, not capital. The objection that earlier scrutiny slows development tends to invert the economics — each surfaces uncertainty while it is still cheap to resolve and options remain open. Identifying unresolved exposure early is less a sign of a troubled program than a program preserving its own optionality.

Executive Questions Before the Next Major Milestone

Before approving the next financing event, clinical milestone, tech transfer, or manufacturing expansion, leadership teams should ask:

1. What manufacturing uncertainty remains unresolved?

2. Which assumptions about readiness have not yet been tested under scale?

3. What recurring operational signals are being normalized rather than investigated?

4. Where does critical process knowledge still reside in individuals rather than systems?

5. If this program were twice its current size, which manufacturing risks would concern us most?

6. Are we accelerating enterprise exposure faster than manufacturing understanding?

7. Have we confirmed the most stable solid form and demonstrated how the process consistently clears critical impurities — not simply that current batches meet specification?

Move from Reading to Assessing

The questions above are intended to create visibility into manufacturing uncertainty before it becomes enterprise risk. To evaluate your own program against the Phase 2 Manufacturing Wall™ framework, complete the P2MW Diagnostic Assessment.

Scan the QR code or visit: www.portfoliocmc.com/diagnostic

Conclusion

The Phase 2 Manufacturing Wall is not where manufacturing risk is created. It is where accumulated uncertainty becomes too consequential for the enterprise to ignore.

The Phase 2 Manufacturing Wall™ is not fundamentally a manufacturing failure.

It is the delayed exposure of uncertainty that remained operationally manageable while the enterprise surrounding the program was still small enough to absorb it. As biotech organizations scale, enterprise dependency often expands faster than the manufacturing understanding supporting it.

For a period of time, this divergence can remain hidden.

- clinical progress continues
- capital expands
- confidence increases

The process appears to function successfully.

Then the operating environment changes. Scale-up broadens variability, distributed execution exposes inconsistency, and operational complexity begins exceeding the depth of understanding supporting the system.

"Organizations rarely fail because uncertainty exists. They fail because uncertainty remains invisible until options begin disappearing."

Organizations that manage this transition successfully are not necessarily those with the largest budgets or the most advanced technologies. More often, they are organizations that treat manufacturing readiness as a strategic capability and invest in understanding before fragility becomes operationally amplified.

The objective is not to eliminate uncertainty. The objective is to recognize it while strategic options still exist.

This paper explains how manufacturing fragility evolves into enterprise risk. A separate question remains: What happens after the gap has already formed?

Many organizations reach the Wall carrying years of accumulated assumptions, commitments, capital deployment, and strategic dependency. At that point, the consequences extend far beyond manufacturing.

The next paper examines how unresolved manufacturing uncertainty translates into enterprise value destruction once capital, timelines, partnerships, and commercial expectations begin compounding around the program.

Appendix A — Illustrative Industry Cases

Ritonavir (Norvir®, 1998)[1]

When an Unknown Crystal Form Forces Product Withdrawal

Two years after launch, multiple lots of the HIV antiviral ritonavir began failing dissolution specifications after emergence of a previously unknown, more thermodynamically stable crystal form.

Executive lesson:
The absence of a polymorph for years is not evidence that no polymorph exists.

Valsartan and the Sartan Class (2018)[2]

When a Process Change Creates a New Carcinogenic Impurity

An alternative tetrazole-formation process introduced a previously unrecognized pathway for formation of N-nitrosodimethylamine (NDMA), a carcinogen, ultimately triggering worldwide recalls and permanent changes in regulatory expectations surrounding nitrosamine risk assessment.

Executive lesson:
Process changes that appear operationally efficient can create entirely new impurity-formation pathways (e.g., nitrosamine formation) that existing release methods were never designed to detect and that regulators may not define limits for until after the product is on the market.

Myozyme® / Lumizyme® (alglucosidase alfa, 2008)[3]

When Scaling a Biologic Creates a Different Product

Genzyme's enzyme-replacement therapy for Pompe disease was approved in 2006 at a 160 L bioreactor scale. To meet demand, the company scaled production to 2000 L — the same cell line, the same molecule. In April 2008, the FDA determined that material from the two scales should be classified as two different products, citing analytical differences in carbohydrate structure identified during comparability work. The larger-scale product required its own clinical study and a separate Biologics License Application, was commercialized under a different name (Lumizyme), and its U.S. availability was delayed by roughly two years.

Executive lesson:

Scaling a biologic is not a volume decision; it can change the product itself. A process that yields an acceptable molecule at one scale can yield a regulatorily distinct one at another, converting a routine capacity expansion into a second development program — with its own trial, filing, and timeline.

Kymriah® (tisagenlecleucel, 2018)[4]

When a Trial-Proven Process Cannot Meet Commercial Specification

Novartis's CAR-T therapy was the first of its kind approved in the United States. Within a year of launch, the company disclosed that product variability — chiefly the percentage of viable cells — was making it difficult to consistently meet commercial release specifications, which were tighter than those used in the pivotal trials. Because each dose is manufactured from an individual patient's variable starting material, a meaningful fraction of product fell out of commercial specification; Novartis supplied those doses through expanded-access and compassionate-use pathways without charging for them, and at times could not ship a usable product at all. The issue persisted for years after approval.

<u>Executive lesson:</u>

A personalized process proven in a trial is not the same as one that meets a stricter commercial specification consistently and at volume. When release criteria tighten at commercialization and the starting material is inherently variable, manufacturing consistency — not efficacy — can become the binding constraint on revenue.

1. Bauer J, Spanton S, Henry R, Quick J, Dziki W, Porter W, Morris J (June 2001). "Ritonavir: an extraordinary example of conformational polymorphism". Pharmaceutical Research. 18 (6): 859–866.

2. Christensen J. "Common heart drug recalled in 22 countries for possible cancer link". CNN. Retrieved 14 July 2018.

3. Genzyme's Lumizyme clears bioequivalence hurdles. Nature Biotechnology. 2009;27(8):685. FDA comparability determination reported in Genzyme Corporation, Form 10-K (fiscal year 2008).

4. Novartis hits CAR-T manufacturing snag as Kymriah sales disappoint. BioPharma Dive. July 19, 2018. See also follow-up reporting, BioPharma Dive, December 6, 2018.

Appendix B — A Guide to Honest Self-Assessment

Scoring the Executive Questions on Evidence, Not Confidence

The questions in the preceding section are only useful if they are answered honestly — and honest answers are harder to produce than they appear. The same dynamic this paper describes, the Illusion of Readiness, operates during self-assessment itself. Teams tend to answer from confidence ("we haven't had a problem") rather than from evidence ("we have characterized the boundaries and know how the process behaves outside them"). Because the absence of a visible problem is precisely what the Wall feels like before it arrives, confidence is the least reliable input available.

This guide offers a single discipline: score each answer on what has been demonstrated, not on what has gone well. For every question, a comfortable answer and an evidence-based answer can sound superficially similar. The difference is whether the answer rests on documented process understanding or on an untested track record.

A practical rule: if the strongest support for an answer is that nothing has gone wrong yet, treat that question as unresolved.

1. What manufacturing uncertainty remains unresolved?

- Comfortable answer: "Nothing major — the process is performing well."
- Evidence-based answer: A maintained, specific list of known unknowns — parameters not yet characterized, ranges not yet tested, behaviors observed but not explained.

What to look for: the ability to name what you don't know. An inability to list any unresolved uncertainty is itself a warning sign, not reassurance.

2. Which assumptions about readiness have not yet been tested under scale?

- Comfortable answer: "We've scaled successfully so far."
- Evidence-based answer: An explicit inventory of which conditions have actually been challenged — scale, site, equipment train, raw-material lots — and which are still assumed to hold by analogy.

What to look for: the distinction between "has held" and "has been tested." Conditions that simply haven't been stressed are assumptions, not findings.

3. What recurring operational signals are being normalized rather than investigated?

- Comfortable answer: "The usual minor deviations — nothing out of the ordinary."
- Evidence-based answer: A named set of recurring signals — investigations, OOS/OOT trends, yield drift, comparability questions — with an explicit decision about which are being absorbed versus understood.

What to look for: whether "normal" has been defined or merely assumed. Routinely explained-away signals are the most common early form of the Wall.

*A note on scoring. This is not a pass/fail instrument, and a high count of "unresolved" answers is not a sign of a troubled program. It is visibility into risk that already exists — surfaced while it is still affordable to address. The objective of the exercise is not a reassuring score. It is an accurate one.

4. Where does critical process knowledge still reside in individuals rather than systems?

- Comfortable answer: "Our team knows this process inside and out."
- Evidence-based answer: An honest map of which critical understanding is externalized in documented, transferable form versus held tacitly by specific people.

What to look for: deep individual expertise is an asset operationally and a liability structurally. The question is not whether people understand the process, but whether the system does.

5. If this program were twice its current size, which manufacturing risks would concern us most?

- Comfortable answer: "We'd scale the same way — it works."
- Evidence-based answer: A specific account of which fragilities would amplify with exposure — single-source dependencies, tacit knowledge, uncharacterized parameters — independent of whether they are currently causing problems.

What to look for: the ability to name failure modes before they manifest. If doubling exposure surfaces no concerns, the assessment is likely optimistic.

6. Are we accelerating enterprise exposure faster than manufacturing understanding?

- Comfortable answer: "Both are progressing well."
- Evidence-based answer: A candid comparison of the rate at which commitments — capital, timelines, partnerships, expectations — are accumulating against the rate at which characterization and control are deepening.

What to look for: direction, not level. Two healthy-looking trajectories can still be diverging. This is the question the entire framework reduces to.

7. Have we confirmed the most stable solid form and demonstrated how the process consistently clears critical impurities — not simply that current batches meet specification?

- Comfortable answer: "Batches are meeting spec."
- Evidence-based answer: Positive evidence that the most thermodynamically stable form has been actively sought (not merely not yet observed), and that impurity clearance is mechanistically understood rather than incidentally achieved.

What to look for: the Ritonavir test. Meeting specification confirms the current form and the current batches — not the absence of a more stable form or an undetected pathway. Demonstrated clearance is not the same as observed compliance.